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1 Introduction
One of the hardest philosophical problems arising from contemporary science
is the problem of quantum reality. What is going on in the physical reality
underlying the predictions of quantum mechanics? It is widely accepted that
quantum-mechanical systems are describable by a wave function. The wave
function need not assign definite position, momentum, and other definite prop-
erties to physical entities. Instead it may assign a superposition of multiple val-
ues for position, momentum, and other properties. When one measures these
properties, however, one always obtains a definite result. On a common pic-
ture, the wave function is guided by two separate principles. First, there is
a process of evolution according to the Schrödinger equation, which is linear,
deterministic, and constantly ongoing. Second, there is a process of collapse
into a definite state, which is nonlinear, nondeterministic, and happens only on
certain occasions of measurement.
This picture is standardly accepted at least as a basis for empirical predic-
tions, but it has been less popular as a story about the underlying physical
reality. The biggest problem is the measurement problem (see Albert (1992);
Bell (1990)). On this picture, a fundamental measurement-collapse principle
says that collapses happen when and only when a measurement occurs. But
on the face of it, the notion of “measurement” is vague and anthropocentric,
and is inappropriate to play a role in a fundamental specification of reality. To
make sense of quantum reality, one needs a much clearer specification of the
underlying dynamic processes.
Another of the hardest philosophical problems arising from contemporary
science is the mind-body problem. What is the relation between mind and
body, or more specifically, between consciousness and physical processes? By
consciousness, what is meant is phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experi-
ence. A system is conscious when there is something it is like to be that system,
from the inside. A mental state is conscious when there is something it is like
to be in that state.
There are many aspects to the problem of consciousness, including the core
problem of why physical processes should give rise to consciousness at all. One
central aspect of the problem is the consciousness-causation problem: how does
consciousness play a causal role in the physical world? It seems obvious that
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consciousness plays a causal role, but it is surprisingly hard to make sense of
what this role is and how it can be played.
There is a long tradition of trying to solve the consciousness-causation prob-
lem and the quantum measurement problem at the same time, by saying that
measurement is an act of consciousness, and that consciousness plays the role of
bringing about wave function collapse. The locus classicus of this consciousness-
collapse thesis is Eugene Wigner’s 1961 article “Remarks on the mind-body
question”. There are traces of the view in earlier work by von Neumann (1955)
and London and Bauer (1939).1 In recent years the approach has been pursued
by Henry Stapp (1993) and others.
The central motivations for the consciousness-collapse view come from the
way it addresses these problems. Where the problem of quantum reality is con-
cerned, the view provides one of the few interpretations of quantum mechanics
that takes the standard measurement-collapse principle at face value. Other
criteria for measurement may be possible, but understanding measurement in
terms of consciousness has a number of motivations. First, it provides one of the
few non-arbitrary criteria for when measurement occurs. Second, it is arguable
that our core pretheoretical concept of measurement is that of measurement
by a conscious observer. Third, the consciousness-collapse view is especially
well-suited to save the central epistemological datum that ordinary conscious
observations have definite results. Fourth, understanding measurement as con-
sciousness provides a potential solution to the consciousness-causation problem:
consciousness causes collapse.
Despite these motivations, the consciousness-collapse view has not been pop-
ular among contemporary researchers in the foundations of physics. Some of
1It is clear that von Neumann (1955) endorses a measurement-collapse interpretation, and
he says (p.418) that subjective perception is “related” to measurement, but he does not clearly
identify measurement with conscious perception. In his discussion of observed systems (I),
measuring instruments (II), and “actual observer” (III), he says “the boundary can just as
well be drawn between I and II+III as between I+III and III”. This suggests neutrality on
whether the collapse process is triggered by measuring devices or by conscious observers. He
also says that the boundary is “arbitrary to a very large extent” (p.420), which is not easy to
reconcile with the fact that different locations for collapse are empirically distinguishable in
principle, as we discuss in section 6. London and Bauer (1939, section 11) say more clearly:
“We note the essential role played by the consciousness of the observer in this transition from
the mixture to the pure case. Without his effective intervention, one would never obtain a
new psi function” (although see French (2020) for an alternative reading).
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this unpopularity may stem from the popularity of the view in unscientific cir-
cles: for example, popular treatments by Capra (1975) and Zukav (1979), who
link the view to Eastern religious traditions. More substantively, the view is fre-
quently set aside in the literature on the basis of imprecision and on the basis
of dualism.
The objection from imprecision is stated succinctly by Albert (1992, pp.82–
3)
“How the physical state of a certain system evolves (on this pro-
posal) depends on whether or not that system is conscious; and so
in order to know precisely how things physically behave, we need to
know precisely what is conscious and what isn’t. What this “theory”
predicts will hinge on the precise meaning of the word conscious; and
that word simply doesn’t have any absolutely precise meaning in or-
dinary language; and Wigner didn’t make any attempt to make up
a meaning for it; so all this doesn’t end up amounting to a genuine
physical theory either.”
We think that the force of this objection is limited. Of course it is true that
‘conscious’ in ordinary language is highly ambiguous and imprecise, but it is
easy to disambiguate the term and make it more precise. Philosophers have
distinguished a number of meanings for the term, the most important of which
is phenomenal consciousness. As usually understood, a system is phenomenally
conscious when there is something it is like to be that system: so if there is
something it is like to be a bat, a bat is phenomenally conscious, and if there is
nothing it is like to be a rock, a rock is not phenomenally conscious. One might
question the precision of this concept in turn, but it is at least a common and
widely defended view (see e.g. Antony (2006); Simon (2017)) that it picks out
a definite and precise property. On this view, phenomenal consciousness comes
in a number of varieties, but it is either definitely present or definitely absent
in a given system at a given time.
In recent years, theories that give precise mathematically-defined conditions
for the presence or absence of consciousness have begun to be developed. The
most well-known of these theories is Tononi’s integrated information theory
(Tononi 2008), which specifies a mathematical structure for conscious states
and quantifies them with a mathematical measure of integrated information.
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Of course it is early days in the science of consciousness, and current theories
are unlikely to be final theories. Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage pre-
cise theories of consciousness, and to reason about they might be combined
with a consciousness-collapse view to yield precise interpretations of quantum
mechanics.
Crucially, when different precise theories of consciousness are combined with
the consciousness-collapse view, these yield subtly different experimental pre-
dictions. As a result, we have a further motivation for taking consciousness-
collapse interpretations seriously: they can be tested experimentally. As we
discuss in section 7, there is a long-term research program of experimentally
testing consciousness-collapse interpretations and eventually supporting a pre-
cise consciousness-collapse interpretation. The required experiments are diffi-
cult, but advances in quantum computing may already exclude certain simple
consciousness-collapse interpretations. Because of these considerations, the un-
derdetermination of conditions for consciousness does not reflect any fundamen-
tal imprecision in consciousness-collapse views. It simply reflects an experimen-
tally testable degree of freedom.
The second common objection to the consciousness-collapse view is that
it is committed to dualism: the view that the mental and the physical are
fundamentally distinct. The consciousness-collapse view treats consciousness in
a special way that seems to exempt it from the standard quantum-mechanical
laws governing physical systems. This remark by Peter Lewis (this volume)
reflects a common attitude:
“Wigner postulates a strong form of interactive dualism in order to
justify a duality in the physical laws. Few will want to follow Wigner
down this path: non-physical minds, especially causally active ones,
are mysterious at best.”
Again, we think the force of this objection is limited.
First: the consciousness-collapse thesis need not lead to dualism. It is com-
patible with materialist views on which consciousness is a complex physical
property. For example, let us suppose a materialist version of integrated infor-
mation theory on which consciousness is identical to Φ∗, the property of hav-
ing integrated information above a certain threshold. Then the consciousness-
collapse theory will say that Φ∗ causes collapse. This interpretation of quantum
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mechanics will involve a fundamental physical law saying that under the condi-
tions specified by Φ∗, collapse is brought about according to the Born rule. A
fundamental law involving a complex physical property may be unlike familiar
physical laws, but it involves nothing nonphysical.
Second: where consciousness is concerned, there are reasons to take dualism
seriously. There are familiar reasons to question whether any purely physi-
cal theory can explain consciousness. One common reason (Chalmers 2003) is
that physical theories explain only structure and dynamics (the so-called “easy
problems” of behavior and the like), and explaining consciousness (the so-called
“hard problem”) requires explaining more than structure and dynamics. These
reasons need not lead to substance dualism, on which consciousness involves
a separate nonphysical entity akin to an ego or soul, but they have led many
theorists to adopt a form of property dualism where consciousness is accepted
as a fundamental property akin to spacetime, mass, and charge.
Where physical theories give fundamental physical laws that connect physical
properties to each other, a property dualist theory of consciousness gives funda-
mental psychophysical laws that connect physical properties to consciousness.
For example, on a property dualist construal of integrated information theory,
there might be a fundamental physics-to-consciousness law saying that when a
system has Φ above a certain threshold, the system will have a corresponding
state of consciousness. Such a law has a structure akin to the Newtonian mass-
to-gravitational-field law, saying that when a system has a certain mass, the
system will have a corresponding gravitational field. On a consciousness-causes-
collapse theory, there will be an additional consciousness-to-physics law saying
that states of consciousness bring about wave function collapse in a certain way.
Putting these theories together might yield a mathematically precise version of
property dualism that specifies the conditions under which consciousness arises
and the role that it plays.
Interestingly, the most common reason among philosophers for rejecting
property dualist theories of consciousness is an argument from physics. This
argument runs roughly as follows: (1) every physical effect has only physical
causes, (2) consciousness causes physical effects, so (3) consciousness is physi-
cal. The key first premise is a causal closure thesis, supported by the observation
that there are no causal gaps in standard physics that a nonphysical conscious-
ness might fill. But wave function collapse in quantum mechanics appears to
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be precisely such a gap, and consciousness-collapse models are at least not ob-
viously ruled out by known physics. The situation is that many physicists rule
out consciousness-collapse models for philosophical reasons (they are dualistic),
while philosophers rule out property dualist models for physics-based reasons
(they violate causal closure).
The upshot is that a central reason to reject the consciousness-collapse the-
sis (it leads to dualism) and a central reason to reject interactionist property
dualism (it violates the causal closure of physics) provide no reason to reject
the two views when taken together. Perhaps there are other reasons to reject
the consciousness-collapse thesis or to reject dualism, but these reasons must be
found elsewhere.
A third common objection to the consciousness-collapse thesis is that it is not
necessary to invoke consciousness in an interpretation of quantum mechanics, as
there are alternative interpretations that give it no special role. Even if we retain
the measurement-collapse framework, it is possible to understand measurement
independently of consciousness, so that nonconscious systems such as ordinary
measuring devices can collapse the wave function. Going beyond this framework,
a number of alternative interpretations have been developed that give no role to
the notion of measurement. These include spontaneous-collapse interpretations
(e.g. Pearle (1976); Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (1986)) which retain a collapse
process but dispense with the need for measurement as a trigger, and hidden-
variable interpretations (Bohm 1952) and many-worlds interpretations (Everett
1957), which eliminate collapse entirely.
We agree that one is not forced to accept a role for consciousness in quantum
mechanics. At the same time, the mere existence of alternative interpretations
is not itself good reason to reject the consciousness-collapse thesis. If it were,
we would have good reason to reject all interpretations. Perhaps the underlying
thought is that the consciousness-collapse thesis is extravagant and has certain
costs, such as dualism. For there to be a serious objection here, an opponent
needs to articulate the costs as objections in their own right. As with every
other interpretation of quantum mechanics, the consciousness-collapse interpre-
tation has both serious costs (dualism) and serious benefits (taking the standard
dynamics at face value, solving the consciousness-causation problem). To assess
any interpretation, we need to weigh its costs against its benefits.
In this article, we are exploring consciousness-collapse models rather than
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endorsing them. In particular, we are not asserting that these interpretations
are superior to other interpretations of quantum mechanics. Both of us have
considerable sympathy with other interpretations and especially with many-
worlds interpretations (see Chalmers (1996, ch.10) and McQueen and Vaidman
(2019)). But we think that consciousness-collapse interpretations deserve close
attention. If it turns out that these interpretations have fatal flaws, they can
be set aside. But if there are consciousness-collapse interpretations without
clear fatal flaws, then these interpretations should be taken seriously as possible
descriptions of quantum-mechanical reality.
In our view, by far the most important challenge to consciousness-collapse
models is not the issue of imprecision or of dualism, but the question of dynamic
principles. Can we find a simple, coherent, and empirically viable set of dynamic
principles governing how consciousness collapses the wave function? If we can
find such principles, consciousness-collapse models should be placed alongside
other dynamic models (including Bohmian hidden-variable models, Everettian
many-worlds models, and Pearle-GRW style spontaneous collapse models) as
serious contenders to be the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics. If
we cannot, then consciousness-collapse models may remain an important spec-
ulative class of models, but they will stay on the second tier of interpretations
until they are cashed out with dynamic principles.
In what follows, we will explore the prospects for consciousness-collapse in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics. We will do this mainly by exploring and
evaluating potential dynamic principles. We focus especially on what we call
super-resistance models, according to which there are special properties that re-
sist superposition and trigger collapse. When these models are combined with
the consciousness-collapse thesis, we obtain models in which consciousness or
its physical correlates resist superposition and trigger collapse. We think super-
resistance consciousness-collapse models are worth investigating, and in this
article we investigate some of them.
In this article we are not trying to solve the hard problem of how physical
processes give rise to consciousness. We are giving an account of the causal role
of consciousness that can be combined with many different approaches to the
hard problem. Our approach is consistent with both materialist views, on which
consciousness is identified with a complex physical property, and dualist views,
on which consciousness is a primitive property that correlates with physical
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properties. Our approach is also consistent with many different theories of
consciousness that correlate consciousness with underlying physical processes.
For concreteness we will often assume a Tononi-style theory of consciousness
on which consciousness is identical to or correlated with integrated information,
but much of what we say should translate straightforwardly to other theories of
consciousness.
We will not be addressing problems that come up for collapse models of
quantum mechanics quite generally. For example, collapse models face impor-
tant challenges stemming from the theory of relativity (collapse seems to require
a privileged reference frame (Maudlin 2011)), and the tails problem (collapse
leaves wave functions with tails (McQueen 2015)). The collapse models we con-
sider certainly face these challenges. These are important challenges, but for
present purposes we will be happy if consciousness-collapse interpretations can
be shown to be about as viable as widely discussed spontaneous-collapse inter-
pretations. Interpretations in both classes will still face the general problems.
A number of ideas about how to deal with them have been put forward, but
this is a topic for another day.
Our aim is to set out the best consciousness-collapse model that we can
and to assess it. Our discussion is speculative and our conclusions are mixed.
We articulate both positive models and serious limitations. We first articu-
late a simple consciousness-collapse model on which consciousness is entirely
superposition-resistant. This model is subject to a conclusive objection (dis-
tinct from those outlined above) arising from the quantum Zeno effect. We
then articulate a model that is not subject to this objection, combining inte-
grated information theory with Pearle’s continuous-collapse theory. We explore
the prospects of empirically testing these models, and discuss some objections.
The model is still subject to both empirical and philosophical objections, but
there are some potential ways forward. The upshot is not that consciousness-
collapse interpretations are clearly correct, but that there is a research program
here worth exploring.
2 Consciousness as super-resistant
One can clarify the options for a consciousness-collapse theory by asking a cru-
cial question for any collapse model of quantum mechanics: What is the locus
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of collapse? That is, which observable determines the definite states that the
collapse process projects superposed states onto? Here there are two options:
there can be a variable locus (different observables serve as the locus on different
occasions of collapse) or a fixed locus (the same observable always serves as the
locus of collapse).
A variable-locus model is closest to standard formulations of quantum me-
chanics. On a standard understanding, many different observable quantities
(e.g. position, momentum, mass, and spin) can be measured and thereby serve
as the locus of collapse. Every observable is associated with an operator. Upon
measurement, the wave function collapses probabilistically into an eigenstate of
that operator, and the measurement reveals the corresponding eigenvalue for
the observable (such as a specific position for the particle), with probabilities
determined by the prior quantum state according to the Born rule.
Henry Stapp’s consciousness-collapse model (Stapp 1993) is a variable-locus
model, on which consciousness collapses whatever observable is being consciously
observed at a given time. The variable-locus approach has some attractions, but
it also faces some hard questions. Not least is the question: what determines
which observable is being measured? This question is hard enough that Stapp’s
model postulates an entirely separate process that determines the locus of col-
lapse. Stapp calls this process “asking a question of nature”, which is supposed
to be something that takes place in the mind of an observer. Stapp takes this
to be a third process distinct from von Neumann’s standard dual processes
of collapse itself and Schrödinger evolution. Stapp takes this third process as
primitive. There are options for analyzing it (perhaps via a precisely speci-
fied observation relation between observers and observables, for example, or by
building awareness of observables into the structure of consciousness), but it is
clear that such a theory will be complex.
One option for a variable-locus consciousness-collapse theory invokes the idea
that consciousness represents certain objects and properties in its environment.
For example, visual experiences typically represent the color, shape, and loca-
tion of observed objects, while auditory experiences represent locations, pitches,
and the like. A consciousness-collapse view may hold that when consciousness
represents observable properties of an observed object, the object collapses into
a definite state of those observables. For example, perceiving the location of
a ball that was previously in a superposition will collapse the ball into a def-
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inite location. One trouble here is that on standard representationalist views,
the represented properties are built into a state of consciousness but the repre-
sented objects are not. In some cases an experience as of a single object may be
caused by no object or by multiple objects in reality, so there is still a difficult
question about which object if any undergoes collapse. This approach may work
better with relationist views where consciousness involves direct awareness of
specific objects and properties, but there will still be many complications.2
Fixed-locus models are simpler in a number of respects, and we will focus on
them. In a fixed-locus measurement-collapse model, there are special properties
that serve as the locus of collapse. In a fixed locus consciousness-collapse model,
consciousness itself (or perhaps its physical correlate) serves as the locus of
collapse. It is this idea that we will develop in what follows.
One natural way to develop a fixed-locus collapse model is through the
idea of superposition-resistance, which we will sometimes abbreviate as super-
resistance. The idea is that there are special superposition-resistant observables,
which as a matter of fundamental law resist superposition and cause the system
to collapse onto eigenstates of these observables (with probabilities given by the
Born rule). The corresponding class of models are super-resistance models of
quantum mechanics.3 There are a number of different ways to make the dynam-
ics of super-resistance precise, some of which we will explore in the following
sections. A strong version of super-resistance invokes fundamental superselec-
tion rules (Wick, Wightman, and Wigner 1952), according to which certain
observables are entirely forbidden from entering superpositions. A weaker ver-
sion invokes principles according to which these superpositions are unstable and
tend to collapse.
There are super-resistance models of collapse that give no special role to con-
sciousness or measurement. One well-known super-resistance model is Penrose’s
model (Penrose 2014) of quantum mechanics on which spacetime structure is
superposition-resistant: when the structure of spacetime evolves into superpo-
sitions over a certain threshold, these superpositions collapse onto a definite
2For representationalist views, see Tye (1995). For relationist views, see Byrne and Logue
(2009). These views may face a version of the Zeno problem in the next section, arising from
whether the states of consciousness themselves can enter superpositions.
3In earlier versions of this article we called superposition-resistant observables “m-
properties” (short for “measurement properties”) and super-resistance models “m-property
models”.
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structure. One can also see the GRW interpretation of quantum mechanics as
an interpretation on which position is mildly superposition-resistant: superpo-
sitions of position tend to collapse, though with low probability for isolated
particles.
Super-resistance models work well with measurement-collapse interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics. In the context of these interpretations, we can
think of a super-resistant property not as a measured property (e.g. particle
position) but as a measurement property (e.g. a pointer position or a conscious
experience). To sketch the idea intuitively: suppose there is a special class
of measurement devices (e.g. oscilloscopes) which have special measurement
properties (e.g. meter readings or pointer locations) that (as a matter of fun-
damental law) resist superposition and tend to collapse. When a measurement
takes place, a measured property affects a measurement property. Suppose that
we have a quantum system (e.g. a particle) in a superposition of locations a and
b, which we represent (simplifying by omitting amplitudes) as the quantum state
|a〉+ |b〉. The particle interacts with a measurement system such that if not for
this principle, it would yield an entangled superposition |a〉 |M(a)〉+ |b〉 |M(b)〉,
where M(a) and M(b) are the states of the measurement system. Because M is
superposition-resistant, the particle and measurement system will instead evolve
into a collapsed state |a〉 |M(a)〉 or |b〉 |M(b)〉, with probabilities given by the
Born rule. The effect will be much the same as if the measured property col-
lapsed directly, but now the measurement properties serve as a single locus of
collapse.
Superposition-resistance is an especially natural idea in the context of consciousness-
collapse models of quantum mechanics. The idea that consciousness resists
superposition is suggested in a brief passage in Wigner (1961), and is later
developed by Albert (1992), and Chalmers (2003).
Wigner writes:
“If the atom is replaced by a conscious being, the wave function
α(φ1 × χ1) + β(φ2 × χ2) (which also follows from the linearity of
the equations) appears absurd because it implies that my friend was
in a state of suspended animation before he answered my question.
It follows that the being with a consciousness must have a different
role in quantum mechanics than the inanimate measuring device:
the atom considered above. In particular, the quantum mechanical
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equations of motion cannot be linear.” (Wigner 1961, p.180)
Wigner’s suggestion seems to be that a state of consciousness cannot be
superposed because it would require being in a “state of suspended animation”.
Wigner does not suggest a dynamic process for collapse here, but potential
processes are fleshed out a little by Albert and Chalmers. Albert suggests a
picture on which the physical correlates of consciousness immediately collapse
once superposed:
All physical objects almost always evolve in strict accordance with
the dynamical equations of motion. But every now and then, in
the course of some such dynamical evolutions (in the course of mea-
surements, for example), the brain of a sentient being may enter a
state wherein (as we’ve seen) states connected with various differ-
ent conscious experiences are superposed; and at such moments, the
mind connected with that brain (as it were) opens its inner eye, and
gazes on that brain, and that causes the entire system (brain, mea-
suring instrument, measured system, everything) to collapse, with
the usual quantum-mechanical probabilities, onto one or another of
those states; and then the eye closes, and everything proceeds again
in accordance with the dynamical equations of motion until the next
such superposition arises, and then that mind’s eye opens up again,
and so on. (Albert 1992, pp.81-2)
Albert is entertaining the view mainly for the sake of argument, and he
almost immediately rejects it in the passage quoted earlier about the imprecision
of consciousness. Chalmers writes more sympathetically:
Upon observation of a superposed system, Schrödinger evolution at
the moment of observation would cause the observed system to be-
come correlated with the brain, yielding a resulting superposition of
brain states and so (by psychophysical correlation) a superposition
of conscious states. But such a superposition cannot occur, so one
of the potential resulting conscious states is somehow selected (pre-
sumably by a nondeterministic dynamic principle at the phenomenal
level). The result is that (by psychophysical correlation) a definite
brain state and state of the observed object are also selected. The
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same might apply to the connection between consciousness and non-
conscious processes in the brain: when superposed non-conscious
processes threaten to affect consciousness, there will be some sort of
selection. In this way, there is a causal role for consciousness in the
physical world. (Chalmers 2003, pp.262-3)
Chalmers in effect combines Wigner’s suggestion that consciousness can-
not superpose with Albert’s suggestion that consciousness collapses its physical
correlates. The key idea here is that consciousness is a superposition-resistant
property and that its physical correlates therefore resist superposition too. That
is, it is difficult or impossible for a subject to be in a superposition of two differ-
ent states of consciousness, and this results in the collapse of physical processes
that interact with consciousness.4
Here the relevant states are total conscious states of a subject at a time. The
total conscious state of a subject is what it is like to be that subject: if what
it is like to be subject A is the same as what it is like to be subject B, then A
and B are in the same total conscious state. A subject’s total conscious state
at a time may include many aspects: visual experience, auditory experience,
the experience of thought, and so on. Like position or mass or color or shape,
consciousness in this form can take on many specific values. Its specific values
are the vast range of possible total conscious states of a subject at a time.
This view assumes that there is a physical correlate of consciousness (PCC):
a set of physical states that correlate perfectly with a system’s conscious states.
For simplicity, we can start by assuming a materialist view where the total con-
scious state and its physical correlate are identical. Things work best if we also
assume that the physical correlate of consciousness (PCC) can itself be repre-
sented as a quantum observable with an associated operator. This assumption
is nontrivial, as not every physical property is an observable; we return to it
later. A PCC observable will have many different eigenstates corresponding to
distinct total states of consciousness. This makes it straightforward to treat
consciousness as a super-resistant property.
To illustrate how this works, we can again suppose an electron in a su-
perposition of locations (again omitting amplitudes for simplicity) |a〉 + |b〉.
The electron registers on a measurement device and then the result is per-
4Halvorson (2011) also argues for a picture on which mental states cannot be superposed
and therefore bring about collapse in the physical world.
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ceived by a human subject. Assuming the measurement device is not conscious,
then at the first stage the electron and the device will go into an entangled
state |a〉 |M(a)〉 + |b〉 |M(b)〉. When the human looks, this result will affect
the eye (E), early areas of the nervous system and brain (B), and eventu-
ally the physical correlates of consciousness (PCC). Under Schrödinger evo-
lution, we would expect the electron, device, and subject to go into an entan-
gled state |a〉 |M(a)〉 |E(a)〉 |B(a)〉 |PCC(a)〉+|b〉 |M(b)〉 |E(b)〉 |B(b)〉 |PCC(b)〉.
However, this superposed state would yield a superposition of states of con-
sciousness. So at the point where the PCC is affected, the system will collapse. It
collapses into |a〉 |M(a)〉 |E(a)〉 |B(a)〉 |PCC(a)〉 or |b〉 |M(b)〉 |E(b)〉 |B(b)〉 |PCC(b)〉,
with Born rule probabilities. In effect, at the point where the measurement
reaches consciousness, the electron, the measurement device, and the brain will
collapse into a definite state.
On a dualist view on which consciousness merely correlates with physical
properties, things are a little more complicated. We focus on forms of dualism
where there are psychophysical laws correlating physical states of a system with
states of consciousness. There will be a set of physical correlates of consciousness
(which may be disjunctive if necessary) that are in one-to-one correspondence
with total states of consciousness. A subject will be in a given state of con-
sciousness if and only if it is in the corresponding PCC state. We can assume
as before that the PCC is a quantum observable. Psychophysical laws connect
unsuperposed PCC eigenstates to unsuperposed states of consciousness. They
also connect superpositions of PCC states to the corresponding superpositions
of states of consciousness. A given subject’s PCC is in a superposition of PCC
eigenstates with certain amplitudes if and only if the subject’s conscious expe-
rience is in a superposition of the corresponding total states of consciousness
with the same distribution of amplitudes.
On a dualist view, a fundamental principle will say that consciousness resists
superposition. Whenever Schrödinger evolution plus the psychophysical laws
entail that a system enters or is about to enter a superposition of total states of
consciousness, the system will collapse into a definite total state of consciousness.
As a result, the PCC will also collapse into an eigenstate, and other physical
entities that are entangled with the PCC will collapse as described above.
One motivation for the super-resistance consciousness-collapse model is given
by Wigner’s suggestion that superpositions of consciousness are “absurd”. That
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is, something about the very nature of consciousness or the concept of conscious-
ness rules out total states where consciousness is superposed. It is certainly at
least very hard to imagine subjects who are in superposed states of conscious-
ness (at least without these states becoming total states of consciousness in
their own right). If something about the nature of consciousness explains why
it cannot be superposed, then this might provide a possible explanation of why
collapse comes about. This explanatory motivation might be seen as a further
motivation for understanding consciousness as the trigger of collapse.
Taking Wigner’s motivation seriously leads to the idea that consciousness is
absolutely superposition-resistant: that is, that it can never enter superpositions,
even brief and unstable ones. Invoking absolute superposition-resistance leads
to a clean and simple dynamic model for collapse involving superselection rules.
Unfortunately this model leads to a fatal problem for absolute super-resistance,
which we explore in the next section.
3 Superselection and the Zeno problem
To develop super-resistance models in more detail, we can start by thinking of
them independently of consciousness. In principle any observable could serve as
a super-resistant observable, with distinct models of quantum mechanics arising
from taking different observables to resist superposition. Later we can consider
the special case where consciousness or its physical correlates serve as super-
resistant observables.
The simplest (albeit fatally flawed) super-resistance model invokes supers-
election: the strong form of super-resistance where certain superpositions are
ruled out entirely. In particular, it invokes the familiar concept of a superse-
lection rule: a rule postulating that superpositions of a specified observable are
forbidden.
Superselection rules are invoked for a number of purposes in quantum me-
chanics.5 Sometimes they are postulated to analyze quantum-mechanical prop-
5Superselection rules were introduced by Wick, Wightman, and Wigner (1952). There are
many somewhat different definitions of superselection rules, analyzed thoroughly by Earman
(2008). Here we use a common informal definition. Superselection rules are invoked in analyses
of the measurement process by Bub (1988), Hepp (1972), Machida and Namiki (1980), and
others. Thalos (1998) gives an excellent review. The most common strategy is to argue that
superselection rules can emerge from the Schrödinger dynamics governing the interaction of
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erties that are never found in superpositions, such as the difference in charge
between a proton and a neutron. Sometimes they are used to help analyze
quantum-mechanical symmetries. Sometimes they are used to help address
measurement in quantum mechanics, most often through the idea that super-
selection can emerge through interaction with the environment by Schrödinger
evolution alone.
Here we are exploring a somewhat different idea: the idea of a superselection
collapse model, with a fundamental superselection rule governing the collapse
process. Such a model will specify a superselection observable, such that phys-
ical systems must always be in eigenstates of the operator corresponding to
the observable. The associated collapse postulate says that whenever a sys-
tem would otherwise enter a superposition of eigenstates of this operator (given
Schrödinger dynamics alone), it instead enters a definite eigenstate, with prob-
abilities given by the Born rule. In the special case where consciousness (or its
physical correlate) is a superselection observable, then whenever consciousness
would otherwise be about to enter a superposition, it must collapse to a definite
state according to the Born probabilities.
To specify the dynamics better, we can first suppose that the collapse takes
place at a time interval of ∆t, so that if the system has evolved (according
to the Schrödinger equation) in the preceding ∆t into a non-eigenstate of the
superselection observable, it collapses probabilistically into an eigenstate of that
operator, with probabilities given by the Born rule. This yields a well-defined
stochastic process. For the absolute super-resistance model, the dynamics is the
limiting case of this process as ∆t approaches zero.
The superselection collapse model has a dynamics that is already famil-
iar in quantum mechanics: it is precisely the dynamics that would obtain (on
a traditional measurement interpretation) if the resistant observable were be-
ing continuously measured by an outside observer. The current approach does
not require that there are any outside observers, or that resistant properties
themselves are ever measured, or that continuous measurement ever takes place
(though to aid the imagination, one could metaphorically suppose that God is
continuously measuring the resistant properties of the entire universe). All that
it requires is the mathematical dynamics associated with continuous measure-
a system with its environment. It is unclear to us whether anyone has explicitly proposed a
superselection collapse interpretation, but we are open to pointers.
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ment of resistant properties, which is fairly straightforward.
Unfortunately, the dynamics of continuous measurement leads to a well
known effect, the quantum Zeno effect, which renders any superselection collapse
model empirically inadequate. The quantum Zeno effect is the effect whereby
the more often one measures a quantum observable, the harder it is for the
system to enter different states of that observable. In the extreme case where
an observable is measured continuously, it cannot change at all.
The source of the quantum Zeno effect lies in the mathematical fact that for
a system to evolve under Schrödinger evolution from some initial eigenstate of
an operator to some other eigenstate of that operator, it must evolve through
superpositions of eigenstates.6 Eigenstates are orthogonal to each other, so the
continuous process of Schrodinger evolution cannot evolve directly from eigen-
state to eigenstate. If a system governed by this process cannot pass through
superpositions of these eigenstates, then the system cannot change from one
eigenstate to another. Another way to put things is that if small superpositions
are permitted, an initial superposition will assign probability 1-ε (where ε is
negligible) to the initial eigenstate. So if there is a measurement of this observ-
able in the first moment, the superposition will collapse to the initial eigenstate
with probability 1-ε. Continuous measurement will therefore force the system
to remain in that initial eigenstate.
This leads to the Zeno problem for superselection collapse interpretations. If
there is a superselection observable (one that can never enter superpositions), ev-
ery system will remain forever in a single eigenstate of that observable. This con-
sequence may be acceptable for standard superselection observables in physics
(such as the charge difference between a proton and a neutron), but it is clearly
unacceptable for observables tied to measurement that serve as triggers of the
collapse process.7 For example, if a superselection observable corresponds to
the position of the pointer on a measurement device, then that pointer will be
forever stuck in one location and unable to give useful measurement results.
6One could argue that this mathematical fact is the common explanation both of the
Zeno effect and of the problem for superselection collapse models, rather than the Zeno effect
explaining the problem. Still, the problem is still aptly called a Zeno problem, tied to the
impossibility of motion.
7Mariam Thalos (1998, p.538) raises a version of this problem for superselection-based
accounts of measurement, arguing that if a classical quantity is governed by a superselection
rule, it can never change its magnitude in evolution over time.
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We can illustrate the Zeno problem by taking the superselection observable
to be consciousness (or its physical correlate). We know that systems have
different conscious states at different times, and sometimes evolve from being
unconscious to being conscious. If consciousness or its physical correlate was a
superselection observable, it would obey the dynamics of continuous measure-
ment so it could not change at all. If we started in an unconscious state, we
could never become conscious. The unfortunate consequence would be that we
could never wake up from a nap. Furthermore, if there is no consciousness in
the early universe, then consciousness could never emerge later.8
The Zeno problem is not just a problem for superselection collapse interpre-
tations. In “Zeno Goes to Copenhagen”, we argue that the Zeno problem is a
serious problem for almost any measurement-collapse interpretation of quantum
mechanics. Any such interpretation faces the question of whether measurement
itself can enter quantum superpositions. If measurement can enter superposi-
tions, the standard dynamics of collapse upon measurement is ill-defined, and
new dynamics is required. If measurement cannot enter superpositions, the
quantum Zeno effect suggests that measurements can never start or finish, at
least if measurement is an observable. One way out is to deny that measure-
ment is an observable, but this option leads to further commitments (embracing
a strong form of dualism or construing measurement as a special wave-function
property) that themselves require a highly revisionary approach.
In this article, however, we are focusing on the Zeno problem as a problem
for super-resistance interpretations. To handle the Zeno problem in this frame-
work, the obvious move is to abandon superselection (on which superpositions
of the relevant observable are entirely forbidden) for a weaker version of super-
resistance. An approximately super-resistant observable is one that can enter
superpositions but nevertheless resists superposition, at least in some circum-
8Barry Loewer (2002) raises a different early-universe problem for consciousness-collapse
theories: if the first collapse requires the universe to be in a non-null eigenstate of con-
sciousness, then this will never happen, while if collapse is triggered by any superposition
of consciousness, then the first collapse will happen too early. The absolute super-resistance
model takes the second horn. On this view, Loewer’s “collapse too early” problem can be
minimized by having conditions for consciousness that are not satisfied in the early universe
(so that in its early stages, the universe will be in a null eigenstate of consciousness), and also
by noting that most initial collapses when they occur will be onto a null state of consciousness.
The Zeno problem as it arises for the early universe is the distinct but related problem that
all collapses will be onto a null state of consciousness.
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stances. On a simple version of this view, superpositions of the observable in
question are unstable and they probabilistically tend to collapse over time.
To make the idea of approximate super-resistance precise, we require non-
standard physics. Fortunately, there is a wealth of resources for developing
such physics in the literature on modern dynamical collapse theories (Bassi et
al. 2013). In section 6, we show how these theories can be adapted to yield a
model on which consciousness is approximately super-resistant. The rough idea
is that as a total state of consciousness (and/or its physical correlate) enters
increasingly large superpositions (where a large superposition is roughly one
that gives significant amplitude to distant states), this yields higher probabili-
ties of collapse of consciousness onto a more definite state. Admittedly it is far
from clear what a superposition of states of consciousness would amount to. We
return to this matter in the final section.
4 Integrated information theory
There are many ways to spell out the details of a consciousness-collapse super-
resistance model. We can combine the view with many different theories of
consciousness, and with various different accounts of the collapse dynamics. In
what follows we spell out one way of working out some details, by combining the
theory with a specific theory of consciousness (integrated information theory, or
IIT) and a specific model of approximate super-resistance dynamics (inspired
by Pearle’s continuous spontaneous localization interpretation of quantum me-
chanics).
We focus on IIT for several reasons. First, it is one of the few mathematically
precise theories of consciousness. Second, unlike many competitors it purports
to be a fundamental theory of consciousness that offers basic and universal
principles connecting consciousness to physical processes. Third, it offers a
specific physical correlate for total states of consciousness, using its notion of a
Q-shape (qualia shape). Fourth, it has a distance metric between total states
of consciousness, which plays an important role in our framework. None of
this means that we are endorsing IIT. Many objections have been made to IIT
(e.g. Aaronson (2014), Bayne (2018), Barrett and Mediano (2019), Doerig et
al. (2019)) and they raise important issues. Our approach could in principle be
combined with any theory that has the four properties just listed.
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IIT is a theory that associates systems with both quantitative amounts of
consciousness and qualitative states of consciousness. Its systems are classical
Markovian networks made up of interconnected units that interact with each
other according to deterministic or probabilistic rules. Each unit can take on a
number of states, and the state of the system is made up of the states of each
of the units in the system.
One limitation of IIT as it stands (Barrett and Mediano (2019)) is that
its assigns amounts and states of consciousness to discrete Markovian network
systems but not to real physical systems. To apply it to real physical systems, we
need to combine it with a mapping from physical systems to network structures.
In what follows we will assume such a mapping (or some other generalization
of IIT) so that IIT applies to physical systems.
IIT is derived from phenomenological axioms rather than from experimental
evidence. Experimental support for it is somewhat limited to date, especially
because it is impractical to measure and calculate its measures of conscious-
ness in biological systems. However, some measurable approximations of its
quantitative measures have been shown to correlate with level of consciousness,
see Massimini et al. (2005), Casarotto et al. (2016), Leung et al. (2020), and
Afrasiabi et al. (2021). Additionally, spatiotemporal patterns of integrated in-
formation (approximating IIT’s qualitative measures) have been derived from
brain areas and correlated with the contents of conscious perceptions of faces
and other objects (Haun et al. (2017)). In any case, we will treat IIT as a poten-
tial empirical theory of consciousness. Much of our discussion should generalize
to other theories.
IIT is built around the notions of information and integration. The infor-
mation in a system is a measure of the extent to which the present state of a
system constrains its potential past and future states. One centerpiece of IIT
is its measure of integration, which it labels Φ. Φ is a measure of the extent
to which the information in a system is irreducible to the information of its
components. It quantifies how much the causal powers of a system fail to be
accounted for by any partitioned version of it.
The simplest system with nonzero Φ is a dyad: a network AB with two
interacting nodes A and B that swap their states. If A is on or off, B turns on
or off at the next time step, and vice versa. In this case, AB has causal powers
that are not reducible to those of A and B taken alone, and Φ(AB) = 1. (We
22
spell out the mathematics in an appendix.) By contrast, if A and B are not
interacting, then the causal powers of AB are reducible to those of A and B
taken alone, so Φ(AB) = 0.
IIT says that a system is conscious if and only if it is a maximum of Φ: that
is, if the system has higher Φ than any system nested within it and higher Φ
than any system it is nested within. The amount of consciousness in a system is
Φmax, which is equivalent to Φ if the system is a maximum and 0 if the system
is not. In what follows we drop the superscript for simplicity.
One way to combine IIT with a super-resistance model is to say that Φ is
super-resistant. That is, Φ resists superposition and superpositions of Φ trigger
collapse. Unfortunately, this view faces a fatal problem. It fails to suppress
superpositions of qualitatively distinct conscious states with the same value of
Φ. Consider a conscious subject and a screen in a dark isolated room. The
screen can display green or blue. If it is put into a superposition of displaying
both, then the subject will be put into a superposition of experiencing green and
experiencing blue. There is no reason to assume that these experiences differ
in their Φ–value. But then there is no Φ–superposition, and so no collapse.
The subject remains in a superposition of qualitatively distinct total states of
consciousness. Such a theory therefore will not yield determinate experiences for
many crucial observations. The underlying problem is that Φ is not a genuine
physical correlate of consciousness – that is, it is not a physical correlate of a
total state of consciousness. It is merely a physical correlate of a scalar degree of
consciousness, where the same degree can be present in many different conscious
states.9
9We canvassed the idea of using Φ as an absolutely super-resistant property in an early
version of this article that raised the Zeno problem for absolute super-resistance and suggested
approximate super-resistance via continuous localization as a possible solution. In an article
responding to our early presentation and building on the ideas there, Okon and Sebastián
(2018) develop the idea that Φ could be an approximately super-resistant property using
continuous localization. Okon and Sebastian respond to our current objection by saying that
decoherence makes it extremely unlikely that there will be superposed conscious states with
the same value of Φ. The blue/green case seems a clear case of this sort of superposition,
however, as does any ensuing state resulting from interactions with their environment that
makes no difference to their total state of consciousness. The dyad system discussed in the
main text and the appendix gives a simple illustration of a superposition of states with different
Q-shapes but with the same value of Φ. In addition, the Q-shape collapse model is much better
suited for giving all aspects of consciousness a causal role, whereas the Φ-collapse model gives
degree of consciousness a causal role and leaves everything else epiphenomenal.
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Fortunately, IIT also postulates a physical correlate of total states of con-
sciousness. The Q-shape (qualia shape) of a system is an entity that serves
as an abstract representation of the structure of the integrated information in
a system. IIT specifies a mathematical mapping from network structures to
Q-shapes. If we assume (as above) that the total physical state of a system
determines a network structure, then IIT will derivatively specify a mapping
from total physical states to Q-shapes.
The Q-shape of S is a set of weighted points, one for each mechanism in
S. A mechanism is a subsystem m of S – that is, a nonempty set of elements
of S – with φ(m) > 0 (as defined in Appendix A). If S has n elements, then
it has up to N = 2n − 1 mechanisms. For example, in the dyad system AB,
which has two elements A and B, the subsystems are A, B, and AB, and the
mechanisms are A and B. The weight associated with a mechanism m is φ(m),
a non-negative real number representing the integrated information associated
with m. The point associated with m is given by two probability distributions
over the 2n states of S, the so-called maximally irreducible cause repertoire and
maximally irreducible effect repertoire associated with m.
According to IIT, a system’s Q-shape determines (at least nomologically)
the total state of consciousness associated with that system. A Q-shape is itself
a mathematical entity, and it is not obvious just how a Q-shape determines a
state of consciousness. What matters most for our purposes is that according
to IIT, (i) having a given Q-shape is a physically definable property (we might
call it physical Q-shape), (ii) Q-shape is a physical correlate of consciousness,
in that any two physical systems with the same associated physical Q-shape
will have the same state of consciousness. It will also be helpful to assume the
stronger theses that (iii) the mathematical structure of a conscious state is given
by a Q-shape (call this a system’s phenomenal Q-shape) and (iv) as a matter of
psychophysical law, a system has a given phenomenal Q-shape (that is, it has
a conscious experience with a given structure) if and only if has the isomorphic
physical Q-shape (that is, it has a physical state with the same structure as
defined by IIT). These claims are far from obviously correct, but something like
them seems to be intended by IIT.
As before, it does not matter too much for our purposes whether these claims
of IIT are correct. It is plausible that a final mathematical theory of con-
sciousness will specify some mathematical structure for consciousness (though
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there may be more to consciousness than its mathematical structure, as in-
verted qualia cases suggest). And it is plausible that this mathematical struc-
ture should be realized in some way in the physical correlates of consciousness.
If necessary, we can replace Q-shape by that mathematical structure. What
matters most is that there is some precise theory of consciousness for which
psychophysical isomorphism principles like this are correct.
Different states of the dyad system AB discussed earlier can be associated
with different Q-shapes. Consider state 10, where A is on and B is off, and
state 00, where both A and B are off. As we show in the appendix, both states
have Φ = 1, but they are associated with distinct Q-shapes. In principle one
can prepare a dyad system in a superposition of these two states 10 and 00: we
might call this Schrödinger’s dyad. If Q-shape is super-resistant, Schrödinger’s
dyad will be unstable and will collapse into a state with a definite Q-shape. We
discuss a framework for combining IIT with quantum mechanics along these
lines in the next two sections. In section 7, we discuss possible experimental
tests, which are likely to rule out the simple Q-shape collapse interpretation but
which suggest a program for empirically refining collapse interpretations.
5 Combining IIT with quantum mechanics10
The standard IIT framework (Oizumi, Albantakis, and Tononi (2014)) maps
classical network states to Q-shapes. We have assumed a derivative mapping
from classical physical states to Q-shapes. To combine IIT with quantum me-
chanics, we need to extend the IIT mapping so that it maps quantum physical
states to Q-shapes or to superpositions of Q-shapes. The core idea of a Q-shape
collapse model is that systems in superpositions of Q-shape always collapse
toward having a determinate Q-shape.
To extend the IIT mapping to quantum physical states, the obvious way to
proceed is to use IIT’s physical definition of Q-shape to define a set of Q-shape
collapse operators, one for each dimension of Q-shape. The joint eigenstates of
these operators will be physical states with determinate Q-shapes.
A challenge to defining these Q-shape operators is that in the classical IIT
framework, φ and Q-shape depend on probabilities of state-transitions in a net-
10This section is co-authored with Johannes Kleiner (Münich Center for Mathematical
Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University).
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work, which may depend on the position and momentum of the system’s parts.
Position and momentum are noncommuting operators, so physical systems can-
not be in joint eigenstates of them. High-mass systems may have precise enough
position and momentum to determine φ and Q-shape, but these quantities may
not be defined for low-mass entities such as electrons in quantum systems (Mc-
Queen (2019b, p97)).
There are various options for addressing this challenge. We could redefine
Φ and Q-shape so they depend only on positions or mass densities of elements
of the system. We could also give special treatment for low-mass systems, for
example modifying Φ to stipulate that Φ = 0 for systems with mass below a
certain threshold, or we could invoke a coarse-grained or “smeared” version of Φ
and Q-shape observables, with significant smearing mainly required for systems
with very low mass.
Alternatively, we can invoke newer versions of IIT that are defined over
quantum states. One framework for an IIT-driven collapse model has been
developed by Kremnizer and Ranchin (2015), who define a new measure of
quantum integrated information QII for quantum systems. On their model,
a system’s QII determines the probability of collapses onto a position basis,
so that systems with higher QII are more likely to collapse on to the position
basis. However, Kremnizer and Ranchin’s interesting model is a super-resistance
theory only in a weak sense: the properties that trigger collapse (QII) are quite
distinct from the collapse basis (position), and position resists superposition
only in certain contexts with high QII. Also, while Kremnizer and Ranchin
speculate that their quantity QII may be a measure of consciousness, this will
yield at best a limited causal role for consciousness, on which the scalar amount
of consciousness determines probability of collapse but the specific conscious
state of a subject plays no role.
Zanardi, Tomka, and Venuti (2018) have developed a more thoroughgoing
quantum-mechanical version of IIT, defining quantum mechanical operators for
each IIT notion (including Q-shape as well as φ) across a broad class of quantum-
mechanical networks. (These are networks of finite-dimensional non-relativistic
qudits, interacting via Markovian trace preserving completely positive maps.)
Further generalizations have been given by Kleiner and Tull (2020). These
models do not yet give a complete mapping from physical states to Q-shapes,
but they come closer to doing this than standard IIT. In what follows, we will
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assume a fully developed model along these lines with a complete mapping from
physical states to Q-shapes.
Quantum IIT specifies a mapping E from states of quantum systems to
quantum Q-shapes. Quantum Q-shapes are are quantum analogs of classical
Q-shapes, the Q-shapes invoked in standard IIT. Classical Q-shapes for an n-
element system S can be represented as N = 2n−1 weighted points, one for each
subsystem of S, where points are pairs of probability distributions and weights
are non-negative real numbers (for a subsystem that is not a mechanism, the
weight will be zero). Quantum Q-shapes likewise involve N weighted points,
where points are now pairs of density operators associated with the Hilbert
space of S and weights are non-negative reals. Where the space of classical Q-
shapes is the Cartesian product of N copies (one for each subsystem) of Pr(S)×
Pr(S)×R+0 , the space of quantum Q-shapes is the Cartesian product of N copies
of D(S)×D(S)×R+0 . Here Pr(S) is the space of probability distributions over
S, whose quantum analog D(S) is the space of density operators over S. R+0 is
the set of non-negative real numbers.11
There is a natural mapping from classical Q-shapes to a subclass of quantum
Q-shapes, deriving from a mapping from Pr(S) to D(S), defined as follows:
(p(si)) 7→
∑
i p(si) |si〉 〈si|. We can call this distinguished subclass of quantum
Q-shapes the quasi-classical Q-shapes. Any quantum Q-shape can be seen as a
superposition of quasi-classical Q-shapes.
Quantum IIT as it stands does not say much about how quantum Q-shapes
correspond to states of consciousness. For our purposes we can add the further
claims that (i) quasi-classical Q-shapes correspond to determinate states of con-
sciousness, exactly as the corresponding classical Q-shapes do in classical IIT,
and (ii) other quantum Q-shapes are superpositions of quasi-classical Q-shapes
and correspond to superpositions of the corresponding states of consciousness.
We can define the quasi-classical states of a quantum system as those quan-
tum states that quantum IIT associates (via the mapping E) with a quasi-
classical Q-shape. If C is the class of quasi-classical Q-shapes, the class of quasi-
classical quantum states is E−1(C), the preimage of C under E. Every state of
11If S is a network of elements with binary states, each weighted point will have 2n+1 + 1
dimensions (two 2n-dimensional probability spaces plus a real number), so classical Q-space
has (2n − 1)(2n+1 + 1) dimensions. In quantum IIT, the 2n dimensional probability-spaces
are replaced by 22n-dimensional density spaces, so quantum Q-space has (2n − 1)(22n+1 + 1)
dimensions.
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a quantum system can then be represented as a superposition of quasi-classical
states, and its associated Q-shape will be a superposition of the corresponding
quasi-classical Q-shapes. We can then set up collapse operators so that quantum
systems always collapse toward these quasi-classical states with quasi-classical
Q-shapes.
One limitation of quantum IIT as it currently stands is that these quasi-
classical states (picked out as those that quantum IIT associates with quasi-
classical Q-shapes) may not closely correspond to what we usually think of as
quasi-classical quantum states such as mass density eigenstates. As a result, the
Q-shape collapse dynamics need not lead to collapse toward standard “classi-
cal” states such as mass density eigenstates and may result in a superposition of
these states (along with a relatively determinate state of consciousness). If we
want to avoid these quantum superpositions as physical correlates of determi-
nate consciousness, there is at least a research program of developing a version
of quantum IIT on which quasi-classical Q-shapes and determinate states of
consciousness are associated with more “classical” quantum states. In what
follows it may be helpful to assume such a version of the framework.
We can now define Q-shape collapse operators. Recall that a Q-shape is a
point in the direct product of N copies of the density operator space D(S). Any




cij |si〉 〈sj | (1)
The Q-shape for any given quantum state ψ consists of 2N density operators
of this kind and N non-negative real numbers. The Q-shape can therefore
be represented by 2N sets of coefficients ckij which we denote as ckij(ψ) (for
k = 1 . . . 2N), and N non-negative real numbers which we denote ϕk(ψ) (for
k = 1 . . . N). For notational simplicity, we duplicate each of the latter, so that
for each k = 1, ... 2N , we have a ckij(ψ) which describes the first or second factor
in D(S)×D(S)×R+0 and a ϕk(ψ) which describes the third factor.





ϕk(ψ)((cij(ψ) + (cji(ψ)) |ψ〉 〈ψ| . (2)
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The sum has been restricted so that it runs over the class E−1(C) of quasi-
classical quantum states, that is, those whose Q-shapes are quasi-classical. As
k ranges from 1 to 2N (where N = 2n − 1) and i and j range from 1 to 2n, an
n-element system will be associated with 22n+1(2n − 1) collapse operators.12
6 Continuous collapse dynamics
To complete our picture of super-resistant consciousness-based collapse, we need
an account of the dynamics of super-resistant collapse. Fortunately, there exist
models of dynamic collapse (due to Philip Pearle and Lajos Diósi, among others)
that can be generalized to model the continuous collapse of any observable.
It is not difficult to adapt these models to model the continuous collapse of
consciousness and its physical correlates such as Q-shape. We start by informally
reviewing these models and the adaptation to consciousness-collapse models,
before providing formal details.13
We start with the continuous spontaneous localization (CSL) model due
to Pearle (1976, 1999, 2021). Pearle’s model is a continuous relative of the
well known GRW model, on which the position of isolated particles undergo
spontaneous localization of position with low probability at any given time. On
CSL, wave functions undergo a gradual stochastic collapse process at all times.
The model provides continuous collapse onto mass density: the amount of mass
present at various locations. It provides a dynamics by which superpositions
of mass density gradually collapse toward definite states of mass density, with
faster collapse in high-mass systems. In effect, CSL is a model on which mass
density is super-resistant.
Pearle’s model can be informally motivated by an analogy between gradual
collapse and the gambler’s ruin game in classical probability theory (Pearle
1982). In the gambler’s ruin, a number of gamblers play against each other
until all but one of them is “wiped out”. Consider two gamblers, G1 and G2,
12For reasons tied to the role of weights within IIT, we have combined the real weights
ϕk and the density operator coefficients cij in defining the Q-shape collapse operators. As
a result there are N fewer collapse operators than dimensions of Q-space. Alternatively
one can define separate operators for the coefficients and real weights as follows: Q̂kij :=∑





13Thanks to Maaneli Derakhshani, Philip Pearle, and Johannes Kleiner for their extensive
help with the material in this section.
29
who have $100 between them such that G1 has $60 and G2 has $40. They toss
a coin: if heads G1 gives a dollar to G2, if tails G2 gives a dollar to G1. As
they keep playing, their respective amounts fluctuate, but the total remains the
same. Eventually, the game ends, as one player acquires $100. It turns out that
G1 wins 60% of the time while G2 wins 40% of the time. That is, the probability
that a given gambler wins is determined by the initial stakes.
In CSL, the squared amplitudes in a superposition (in the preferred basis)
play a continuous stochastic gambler’s ruin game against each other, fluctuating
up and down until one “wins”, thereby completing the collapse. The probability
that a given state vector “wins” a collapse in the long run is determined by its
initial squared amplitude according to the Born rule. Crucially, we may control
the speed at which the games are played in terms of certain (experimentally
bounded) parameters. This allows large superpositions to collapse quickly and
small superpositions to collapse at a negligible rate.
Like the GRW theory, Pearle’s theory involves a weak sort of super-resistance.
Mass density resists superposition weakly, in that an isolated particle will only
gradually collapse toward a definite position and so a definite mass density. At
the fundamental level, superpositions of mass density will be ubiquitous. How-
ever, when many particles are entangled in a macroscopic system, the mass
density of the system as a whole will collapse extremely fast, so that we will
never encounter macroscopic systems in large superpositions of mass density.
Continuous collapse models can be adapted to work with super-resistant
properties other than position and mass density. Given any observable, we can
postulate a continuous collapse process with a version of the Pearle dynamics
applied to this observable. Squared amplitudes for eigenstates of the observable
engage in a stochastic gambler’s ruin process, so that systems in superposi-
tions of the observable collapse quickly or slowly toward their eigenstates via a
gamblers-ruin process.
A related collapse process is postulated in the Penrose (2014) model of grav-
itational collapse, where spacetime curvature is super-resistant. Superpositions
of spacetime curvature collapse onto definite states. Unlike Pearle, Penrose
does not give a fully defined dynamics for collapse. He defines a superposition
lifetime, h̄/∆EG, where h̄ is Planck’s constant and ∆EG is the gravitational
self-energy of the difference between the mass distributions belonging to the
two states in the superposition. But the dynamics of collapse during this life-
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time are not specified.14
An account of the dynamics of gravitational collapse has been indepen-
dently provided by Lajos Diósi (1987). Diósi sets out a stochastic version of the
Schrodinger equation on which there is a continuous collapse process onto space-
time structure. Diósi’s dynamic collapse process is closely related to Pearle’s
continuous spontaneous localization process, with some differences arising from
the use of a collapse onto gravitational structure as opposed to mass density.
It turns out that the Diósi and Pearle dynamics are both instances of a
general formulation of continuous collapse dynamics which can be applied to
any collapse operator. Such a formulation has been presented by Angelo Bassi
and coauthors (2017).15 We will adapt this formulation to set out a dynamics
for continuous collapse onto consciousness.
In the context of IIT, we can use this general dynamics to develop a view
on which Q-shape is super-resistant. Informally: Suppose a system is in a
superposition of two Q-shapes, each with an associated amplitude. We can
stipulate a “localization” dynamics for this superposition that works much like
Pearle’s except that collapse is toward eigenstates of Q-shape. The amplitudes
trade off probabilistically with each other over time, in effect playing gambler’s
ruin at a rate proportional to the distance between the two Q-shapes. In the
long run, the system will collapse onto a specific Q-shape with probability given
by its initial squared amplitude.
We can spell out the mathematical details as follows. The general framework
for continuous collapse rests on using a modified version of the Schrodinger
equation that includes a nonlinear and stochastic term for collapse as well as
the standard linear deterministic evolution. To be consistent and compatible
with constraints such as no superluminal signalling, nonlinear modifications to
14The Hameroff and Penrose (2014) “Orch OR” model extends Penrose’s model of collapse
into a model of consciousness. The Penrose-Hameroff model is not a consciousness-collapse
model either: Penrose and Hameroff hold that collapse is triggered by superpositions of space-
time curvature rather than by consciousness or measurement, and that collapse causes con-
sciousness rather than vice versa. Our approach might be considered a distant cousin of the
Penrose-Hameroff model, with the main differences on our approach being: (i) consciousness
causes collapse rather than vice versa, (ii) collapse is onto Q-shape rather than onto spacetime
curvature, (iii) the collapse dynamics corresponds somewhat more closely to Pearle’s model
rather than Diósi-Penrose’s, and (iv) as discussed later, we make no claims about quantum
coherence and quantum computation in the brain.
15See also Pearle (1999, eqn.10) and Bassi et al. (2013, eqn.14).
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the Schrodinger equation must take a highly constrained stochastic form. This








Here ψt is the wave function state at t, Ĥ0 is the Hamiltonian, λ is a real-
valued parameter governing collapse rate, Â is a collapse operator, 〈Â〉t is its
expected value at t, and Wt is a noise function allowing for stochastic behavior.
The equation allows continuous stochastic collapse toward an eigenstate of the
operator Â at a rate governed by λ and W , with probabilities given by the Born
rule.
It is straightforward to generalize this equation to multiple collapse opera-
















Here α = i, j, k is a multi-index that comprises the indices in (2). If there is
little difference in the superposed Q-shapes, then the first term on the right hand
side (representing Schrödinger evolution) dominates. Otherwise, the system col-
lapses toward a joint eigenstate of the collapse operators, at a rate proportional
to the sum of the difference between their eigenvalues.
The noise function Wα,t is responsible for the stochastic “gambler’s ruin”
collapse behavior described earlier.17 In CSL and other mass density collapse
models, the collapse operators correspond to local mass densities m̂(x) (the
amount of mass at location x). The CSL noise function is given by Wiener
processes Wt(x), representing Brownian motion through time at location x. The
noise at different spatial locations x and y is correlated by a spatial correlation
function G(x− y), which in CSL is a Gaussian function of the distance between
x and y. This ensures that collapse rate depends on the distance between mass
density distributions.
16Bassi et al. (2013, eqn.36)
17For a simple illustration of how this works, see Pearle (1999, sec. 2.2).
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In our IIT-based collapse model, we can define the collapse rate so that it
depends on the extended Earth movers distance EMD* between Q-shapes (see
the appendix). To ensure this, we can stipulate that the spatial correlation
function involved in the noise functions Wt(x) is defined in terms of Earth
movers’ distance: specifically, G(x, y) = 1/EMD∗(x, y) (with an appropriate
cut-off for when EMD∗(x, y) is small or zero; we omit the details).
In CSL it is also standard to “smear” the mass density operator with the
same Gaussian G(x − y), so that collapse is onto smeared mass density eigen-
states rather than precise mass density eigenstates, thereby avoiding large vio-
lations of energy conservation.18 Our equation is simpler because our collapse
operators do not correspond to points (or smeared regions) in a continuous space
but instead correspond to a discrete set of mechanisms. We therefore do not
need to include a smearing function in our equation. In principle, however, it is
straightforward to add such a smearing function as in mass density models.
Our equation (4) assumes that all superposed Q-shapes are Q-shapes of a
single system (network of units) with a fixed number of units and a fixed causal
structure. It does not address the case where we have a superposition involv-
ing Q-shapes of systems with different numbers of units or causal structures.
Extending the current framework to handle those cases is a further project.
The overall theory may look complex, but the underlying principles are fairly
simple. First, there is an IIT-style quasi-classical psychophysical theory linking
physical Q-shape by a structural isomorphism to phenomenal Q-shape in states
of consciousness. Second, there is a generalization of this theory to the quantum
realm, so that superpositions of physical Q-shape are linked to superpositions of
phenomenal Q-shape and so to superpositions of states of consciousness. Third,
there is the key claim that consciousness is super-resistant. More specifically,
phenomenal Q-shapes resist superposition via a Pearle-style principle of con-
tinuous collapse for Q-shapes, so that superpositions of consciousness rapidly
become more determinate. Putting these elements together: superpositions in
the environment lead to superpositions of Q-shape in the brain, which lead
to superpositions of consciousness. These superpositions of consciousness will
rapidly collapse, yielding collapse in the correlated Q-shapes and collapse in the














brain states and the environmental states that are entangled with Q-shape.
7 Experimental tests
Different super-resistant collapse models make different predictions. For any
proposed super-resistant property, in principle it is possible (though usually ex-
tremely difficult) to test whether a system is in a superposition of that property.
This means that in principle (although not yet in practice) it is possible to test
which systems can collapse quantum wave functions, and in virtue of which of
their properties. For example, in principle we can test whether atoms, molecules,
cells, worms, mice, dogs, or humans, as well as oscilloscopes, computers, and
other devices have the capacity to collapse a wave function.19
To test whether a given property supports superpositions, one can use an
interferometer for this property, which detects interference between superposed
quantities in much the same way that a double-slit experiment detects inter-
ference between superposed positions. In practice it is extraordinarily difficult
to set up interferometers for complex properties instantiated by complex sys-
tems, because of the need to prepare the relevant system in complete isolation
from environmental effects. To date, the most complex such measurements have
detected interference in large molecules with around 2000 atoms (Fein, Geyer,
Zwick, et al. 2019). Current limitations are practical rather than principled, and
measurements for more complex properties are certainly possible in principle.
These tests have clear implications for super-resistance models. In abso-
lute super-resistance models, superpositions of super-resistant observables are
impossible. In approximate super-resistance models, these superpositions are
unstable. So at least on a first approximation: if we detect widespread su-
perpositions of an observable, that tends to disconfirm models on which that
observable is super-resistant.
19It is occasionally suggested that we know from existing results that ordinary measuring
devices collapse the wave function, perhaps because we always find them in definite states,
or because their measurements do not lead to quantum interference. However, it is easy to
see that these observations are all equally consistent with a view on which only humans (say)
collapse wave functions, and measurement devices are observed by humans and entangled
with their environment. Sophisticated variants of this objection are made by Koch and Hepp
(2006) and Carpenter and Anderson (2006). Okon and Sebastián (2016) explain what goes
wrong in these objections.
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On a second approximation, all this depends on just how unstable the su-
perpositions are. We can distinguish fast-collapse models on which large su-
perpositions of a super-resistant observable are rare, from slow-collapse models
on which large superpositions are common. Here a large superposition of an
observable is a superposition of significantly different eigenstates of the observ-
able with significant amplitudes for significant periods (where “significant” is
a placeholder for now). If we frequently detect large superpositions of an ob-
servable, this tends to disconfirm at least fast-collapse super-resistance models
involving that observable. These results do not disconfirm slow-collapse models
as easily. Still, where consciousness-collapse models are concerned, fast-collapse
models are arguably preferable to slow-collapse models, as the latter allow that
large superpositions of conscious states are common. So for now, we will focus
on fast-collapse models, returning to slow-collapse models shortly.
We may already be in a position to test fast-collapse models in which Q-
shape is super-resistant. This project is aided by the fact that even quite simple
systems (such as a dyad) can have nonzero Φ and nontrivial Q-shapes, as we have
seen. To test the hypothesis, we need only prepare a quantum computer to enter
superpositions of Q-shape. The simplest example is Schrödinger’s dyad (from
section 4): two units A and B in a superposition of connected and disconnected
states with distinct Q-shapes. If we find the interference effects predicted by
standard quantum mechanics (which assumes that simple systems do not per-
form measurements and evolve according to Schrödinger dynamics), this will
falsify the hypothesis that Q-shape is super-resistant, at least on a fast-collapse
model. If we do not find these effects, this will suggest that these superpositions
are impossible or unstable and will tend to support the hypothesis that Q-shape
is super-resistant.
Something along these lines could be done with a quantum version of a
Fredkin crossover gate.20 A classical Fredkin gate involves three bits, a control
bit and two other bits A and B. If the control bit is 1, bits A and B are swapped.
If the control bit is 0, bits A and B are left as is. In a quantum version of the
Fredkin gate, the control bit can be in superposition, and the AB system will
then be in a superposition of bit-swapping and staying constant. As a result,
IIT appears to suggest that the AB system will be in a Q-shape superposition.
If Q-shape is super-resistant in a fast-collapse model, we should expect this
20Thanks to Scott Aaronson for this suggestion.
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superposition to collapse.
In fact, a quantum Fredkin gate has recently been constructed (Patel et
al. 2016), with results indicating a successful superposition. However, in this
example, it does not seem that the conditions for Φ(AB)=1 are met, because
there is no two-way feedback interaction between gates A and B. In IIT, purely
feedforward networks typically have zero Φ. A feedforward network can have
nonzero Φ if it has overlapping inputs and overlapping outputs, but this does
not appear to be happening in the quantum Fredkin gate.21
How might we properly construct feedback systems such as AB using quan-
tum computers? In the quantum computing literature, two primary types of
quantum feedback are distinguished. The traditional type is measurement-based
feedback. Here, a quantum system performs some (usually feedforward) pro-
cessing and is measured, and the measurement result is then fed back into the
quantum system as input. This will not help for our purposes. A more re-
cent development is coherent quantum feedback (Lloyd 2000), where feedback
connectivity obtains in the quantum system itself. Superpositions of coherent
quantum feedback could be used to build our dyad system in a superposition of
states.
For example, consider the ion-trap example discussed by Lloyd (2000, p4).
The initial state of the system is |ψ〉s |0〉m |φ〉c, where |ψ〉s is the unknown state
of the “system” ion, |φ〉c is the prepared state of the “controller” ion and |0〉m
is the vibrational mode cooled to its ground state. Lloyd explains how cer-
tain directed pulses can evolve the system from |ψ〉s |0〉m |φ〉c to |↓〉s |ψ′〉m |φ〉c,
to |↓〉s |φ′〉m |ψ〉c, and finally to |φ〉s |0〉m |ψ〉c. In effect, the initial unknown
state of the system ion is swapped with the initial state of the controller ion.
Schrödinger’s dyad may then be constructed by putting the input pulses into
a superposition of implementing this swap and not implementing this swap,
yielding: α |ψ〉s |0〉m |φ〉c + β |φ〉s |0〉m |ψ〉c. If the two terms in the superposi-
tion yield distinct Q-shapes, then our model predicts that this superposition is
unstable and will eventually collapse, even if the system remains isolated.
The issue is not entirely straightforward, as it might be denied that the full
21This points to another test case that can be realized by a quantum computer. Perhaps
the simplest feedforward system with nonzero Φ is a dyad system CD that forms a layer of
a feedforward network, whereby a node from a previous layer gives input to both C and D,
and both C and D give input to a node in a subsequent layer. For illustration, see Oizumi,
Albantakis, and Tononi (2014, Fig. 7(B)).
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conditions for Φ(AB)=1 are met (perhaps because of the role of the vibrational
mode or the pulses). Still, it seems likely that some technologically feasible
quantum computation involves a superposition of Q-shapes. If found, such a
superposition will falsify the combination of standard IIT (on which Q-shape
is the physical correlate of consciousness) and the fast-collapse consciousness-
collapse thesis.
More generally, most proponents of quantum computing predict that super-
posed states in larger and larger systems will gradually be demonstrated. It
would be foolhardy to bet against these predictions. In the face of these re-
sults, one could maintain an IIT-collapse view by modifying IIT somewhat: for
example to say that a system is conscious (and has a Q-shape) only when Φ
is above a certain threshold, or by adding other constraints to the definition
of Φ so that the relevant simple systems have Φ = 0. Alternatively one could
adopt a slow-collapse version of the model; one could reject IIT entirely for a
different theory of consciousness; or one could reject the consciousness-collapse
thesis. Still, this shows how even near-term experimental results from quantum
mechanics can have some bearing on theories of consciousness.
All this brings out that the consciousness-collapse thesis in its fast-collapse
version is not easy to combine with panpsychist theories of consciousness on
which consciousness is found even in very simple systems. A strong panpsychist
fast-collapse view on which position or mass or charge quickly collapses the wave
function is straightforwardly refuted by standard experimental results showing
interference effects. The more recent results of Fein et al demonstrating super-
positions of position in 2000-atom systems tend to suggest that the threshold
for collapse lies somewhere beyond that level. There are some quasi-panpsychist
collapse views involving slightly more complex properties distinct from position
that have not yet been tested, but we should easily enough be able to test them
as above, and few would expect them to be supported. The consciousness-
collapse thesis (in fast-collapse versions) tends to fit more comfortably with
non-panpsychist views on which consciousness arises only in relatively complex
systems. These views are consistent with existing and likely near-term-future
observations, while still being subject to experimental test eventually.
There remains the possibility of slow-collapse models on which superpo-
sitions of consciousness tend to collapse slowly across long periods. If these
models allow widespread large superpositions of human states of consciousness,
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these views are hard to reconcile with introspection, and it also becomes less
clear why we should accept the consciousness-collapse view over an Everett-style
view where one’s consciousness is constantly in large superpositions. Perhaps
there could be a CSL-style slow-collapse panpsychist model on which superpo-
sitions of consciousness are common but unstable at the microphysical level,
in the way that superpositions of mass distribution are common but unstable
at the microphysical level in CSL. In CSL, large superpositions of macroscopic
mass distributions are nevertheless uncommon. Likewise, a panpsychist slow-
collapse view might have the consequence that large superpositions of human
consciousness are uncommon, especially on a constitutive panpsychist view on
which human consciousness is constituted by patterns of microconsciousness.
Such a view will face the notorious combination problem of how this constitu-
tion works, and it may also have less of an irreducible causal role for human
consciousness than other collapse views. Still, there are various versions of a
slow-collapse model worth exploring.
There are also empirical constraints on super-resistance models tied to en-
ergy conservation (collapses tend to produce excess energy, so they cannot be too
frequent or too dramatic22) and to the quantum Zeno effect (a super-resistance
model must allow superpositions to persist long enough to avoid Zeno effects,
while not persisting so long that measurements do not have definite outcomes).
All these phenomena impose constraints that narrow the class of available super-
resistance models: super-resistant properties are not too simple and not too
complex, while collapses are not too frequent and not too slow.
For a super-resistance model to be empirically supported, we will eventually
have to find systems and properties that resist superposition. One key (if cur-
rently far-fetched) experiment would use an interferometer on a human isolated
from their environment, preparing them to enter a superposition of conscious
states and seeing if interference effects are observed. If interference effects are
not observed, one will have experimental support for the claim that humans
22The main difficulty in the experimental detection of such effects involves controlling all
the possible ways of cooling. Thus, in their discussion of testing GRW and CSL, Feldmann and
Tumulka (2012) consider the Kubacher Kristallhöhle, the largest natural cave in Germany,
which is 9◦ C all year around. When surface temperatures are low, heat spontaneously created
in the cave cannot be transported away, thereby suggesting a way of obtaining an empirical
bound on the rate of spontaneous warming. It is much more difficult to see how we could find
empirical bounds on spontaneous warming in conscious systems, but it may not be impossible.
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can collapse wave functions. As before this would not decisively demonstrate
that consciousness is doing the work, but it would give reason to take that view
seriously. If interference effects are not observed, one will have experimental
support for the claim that humans cannot collapse wave functions. This will
also tend to falsify any measurement-collapse formulation of quantum mechan-
ics, and in particular will tend to falsify the view that consciousness collapses
the wave function. In this way the framework of this article may ultimately be
subject to empirical test.
Admittedly, it is not clear that it will ever be possible to isolate and test a
conscious human brain in this way. Perhaps somewhat more feasible in the long
term could be running a detailed simulation of a human brain on a quantum
computer. If interference effects are not observed, one will have experimental
support for the claim that the computational structure of the human brain can
collapse wave functions. If they are not observed, one will have evidence against
this claim. However, this result will leave open the hypothesis that other features
of the human brain that are not replicated in a simulation, such as biological
features, are responsible for wave-function collapse. It may be especially difficult
to test biological collapse models, as many standard methods of isolating sys-
tems to test for superposition require low temperatures where the biology may
break down. Still, these quantum computing experiments might at least give us
evidence for or against a consciousness-collapse model where the correlates of
consciousness are computational. In the long run, advances in quantum com-
puting are likely to heavily constrain the prospects for consciousness-collapse
models.
8 The causal role of consciousness
On the picture we have sketched, superpositions of physical Q-shape drive col-
lapse. How does this yield a causal role for consciousness?
On a materialist view which identifies physical Q-shape (a physical prop-
erty) with phenomenal Q-shape (a property of consciousness), the causal role
is straightforward. Superpositions of consciousness involve superpositions of
phenomenal Q-shapes, which trigger collapse onto more definite phenomenal Q-
shapes, which are themselves more definite physical Q-shapes, leading to more
definite physical consequences.
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On a dualist view, physical Q-shape may be ontologically distinct from phe-
nomenal Q-shape, so a causal role for the former is not yet a causal role for
consciousness. The simplest way to derive a causal role for phenomenal Q-shape
is to assume (i) that consciousness has a quantum structure whereby subjects
are in superpositions of phenomenal Q-shapes iff they are in corresponding su-
perpositions of physical Q-shapes, and (ii) a fundamental principle saying that
phenomenal Q-shape is super-resistant and obeys the collapse dynamics we have
developed. When subjects are in superpositions of phenomenal Q-shapes, these
Q-shapes collapse according to the dynamics. Phenomenal Q-shapes are per-
fectly correlated with physical Q-shapes, so collapse of phenomenal Q-shapes
leads to collapse of physical Q-shapes, and the standard ensuing physical effects
of collapse.
Someone might object that we do not give a genuine causal role to nonphys-
ical consciousness at all. Instead, all the causal work is done by the physical
correlates of consciousness.
One version of this objection notes that on a dualist consciousness-collapse
interpretation, there will be PCC states (e.g. physical Q-shapes, on the IIT
framework) that correlate perfectly with consciousness. One can then develop a
physicalist collapse interpretation on which the primary locus of superposition-
resistance is the PCC states. Collapse of the PCC states does all the causal
work, and collapse of consciousness is causally irrelevant. There will at least
be a possible world (we might think of it as a quantum zombie world) where
collapse works this way. In that world, the physical wave function will evolve
just as in our world. So even in our world, consciousness may seem redundant.
In response: on the dualist interpretation spelled out above, it is conscious-
ness that directly causes the wave function to collapse. There is a fundamental
principle saying that consciousness resists superposition. (In the IIT frame-
work, phenomenal Q-shapes resist superposition.) This leads to probabilistic
collapse toward determinate states of consciousness. This collapse of conscious-
ness brings about physical collapse to a more determinate PCC state, because
of a psychophysical law ensuring that states of consciousness and their physical
correlates (in the IIT framework, phenomenal Q-shapes and physical Q-shapes)
are always in alignment. So consciousness is causally responsible for collapse in
our world. There may be other models where physical correlates cause collapse
directly, but that is not how things work on the dualist interpretation we have
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specified.
The quantum zombie scenario does suggest that there is a sort of struc-
tural/mathematical explanation that might be given for our actions without
mentioning consciousness. Still (as is familiar from discussions of panpsychism
and Russellian monism), this structural explanation would not provide a com-
plete explanation of our actions, precisely because it leaves out the role of con-
sciousness in grounding that structure. Like many structural explanations, it
leaves out the actual causes. In the actual world consciousness is causing the
relevant behavior, and consciousness may explain why it is that we behave de-
terminately at all.
A related objection asks: in the actual world, how do we know that it is
consciousness that triggers collapse, and not its physical correlates? As we
discussed in the last section, if there is a perfect correlation between the two,
these hypotheses cannot be distinguished experimentally. Still, insofar as we
already have reason to believe that consciousness is a fundamental property, then
the hypothesis that consciousness triggers collapse has at least two advantages.
First, this way the fundamental law of collapse involves a fundamental property.
Second, this way we have a causal role for consciousness, cohering with a strong
pretheoretical desideratum. These virtues give reasons to favor the view over
the alternative.
One might also object that even if our models give consciousness a causal
role, they do not give consciousness the kind of causal role that we pretheo-
retically would expect it to have. One worry is that collapsing consciousness
may affect the objects we perceive, but we want consciousness to affect action,
producing intelligent behavior and verbal reports such as ‘I am conscious’.
One worry is that the most obvious effects of collapse point the wrong way:
collapse of consciousness will collapse perceived objects such as measurement
instruments, but what we want is for consciousness to affect action. In response,
we can note that a collapse of consciousness will collapse an associated PCC state
in the brain, and this brain state will be entangled with action states or will at
least cause a corresponding action state, so a collapse of consciousness will help
bring about a determinate action. For example, if consciousness probabilistically
collapses into an experience of red rather than an experience of blue, this collapse
will bring about a PCC state associated with experience of red, which will tend
to lead to an utterance of ’I am experiencing red’ rather than ’I am experiencing
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blue’.
Furthermore, consciousness also involves the experience of agency and action:
say, the experience of choosing to lift one’s left hand rather than one’s right hand.
Superpositions of these states will collapse into definite states, which will lead
to actions such as raising one’s left hand.
This picture naturally raises issues about free will. On this view, the expe-
rience of choice plays a nondeterministic causal role in bringing about action.
On some popular conceptions of “free will”, on which what matters for free will
is nondeterminism and a role for consciousness, this picture may vindicate free
will in the relevant sense. Others may object that the choices are themselves
selected probabilistically, and that random choices are no better than deter-
ministic choices when it comes to free will. We think the issues are far from
straightforward, so we will set aside issues about free will here, but we note that
a causal role for consciousness can be expected to have some bearing on those
issues.
Another objection is that if consciousness always collapses via the Born role,
then any effect of consciousness on action will at best be a sort of dice-rolling
role. It will probabilistically select between different available outcomes, but
it will not yield a qualitatively special outcome. Under a hypothesis where
PCC states collapse the wave function, purely physical quantum zombies would
have behaved the same way. So consciousness will not make outcomes on which
humans behave intelligently or on which they say ’I am conscious’ any more
likely than they would have been if some other property had collapsed the wave
function. One might even simulate the dynamics in a classical computer (with a
pseudorandom number generator), with no role for consciousness, and the same
patterns of behavior would ensue.
Most of what this objector says is correct. The quantum zombie scenario
suggests that there is a sort of structural/mathematical explanation that might
be given for our actions without mentioning consciousness. Still, this structural
explanation would not provide a complete explanation of our actions, precisely
because it leaves out the role of consciousness in grounding that structure. (Like
many structural explanations, it leaves out the actual causes.) In the actual
world consciousness is causing the relevant behavior, and consciousness may
explain why it is that we behave determinately at all. One might have liked a
stronger, more transformative causal role for consciousness that could not even
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in principle have been duplicated without consciousness, but it is not clear why
such a role is essential.
If one does want a stronger role for consciousness, the most obvious move is
to suggest that the role for consciousness in collapse is not entirely constrained
by the Born probabilities. Perhaps perceptual consciousness obeys those con-
straints (thereby explaining our observations in quantum experiments), but
agentive experience does not. For example, collapses due to agentive experi-
ence might be biased in such a way that more “intelligent” choices that lead to
more intelligent behavior tend to be favored than they would be according to
the Born rule. This picture sacrifices the great simplicity of the original quan-
tum dynamics, and it could perhaps be disconfirmed through the right sort of
experiments and simulations, but it is arguable that our current evidence leaves
room open for it. We do not find this picture especially attractive, but it is at
least worth putting it onto the table.
9 Philosophical objections
We have already considered many objections to our account. Some are tech-
nical issues specific to the use of IIT: for example, whether IIT applies to real
physical states, whether Q-shape operators can be defined, and whether a Q-
shape/collapse theory has already been falsified by existing experimental results.
These are serious issues that may require modifying IIT or moving to a different
theory of the physical correlates of consciousness. Some are versions of objec-
tions that arise for many objective collapse theories: for example, consistency
with relativity and the tails problem. These are also serious issues that we have
set aside for now with the preliminary aim of getting consciousness-collapse
models closer to the level of seriousness of existing objective collapse theories.
A final technical issue is whether the parameters of a consciousness-collapse
theory can be set to avoid the Zeno effect.
In this final section we consider a number of philosophical objections. We
have already considered objections concerning the causal role of consciousness.
The largest objection remaining concerns superposed states of consciousness.
Objection 1: What is a superposed state of consciousness?
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As we saw earlier, Wigner said that it is “absurd” to suppose that a subject
could be in a state of “suspended animation”, that is, in a superposition of
multiple states of consciousness. However, the approximate super-resistance
model we have developed requires that subjects can be in such superposed
states. Large superpositions of consciousness (those between significantly dif-
ferent states with significant amplitude for significant periods) will be rare, at
least on a fast-collapse model, but they will be possible. Small superpositions
of consciousness (those that are like large superposition except that they are
brief, or low-amplitude, or between closely related states) may be ubiquitous.
In fact, on these models it may be that most or all conscious subjects are in
small superpositions of consciousness most or all of the time. This raises the
questions: are superpositions of consciousness possible, and if so how can we
understand them?
There are a few different ways of trying to understand superposed states
of consciousness. First, one could try to understand them as familiar states:
for example, a superposition of seeing an object at positions A and B might
be a state of double vision. However, double vision is an ordinary state of
consciousness that can enter superpositions. It leads to reports such as “I see
an object at A and at B”. The superposed state does not. It leads to reports
such as “I see an object at A” (if the introspection and report process triggers
collapse), or at worst a superposition of “I see an object at A” and “I see an
object at B” (if no collapse is triggered). This brings out that the sort of
superpositions we need are not introspectible or reportable and will be quite
different from familiar states such as double vision.23
A more radical alternative says that superposed states of consciousness in-
volve multiple subjects having distinct total states of conscious experience. We
will set aside this option as extravagant (do subjects pop into and out of exis-
tence in superposition and collapse?), though it is perhaps worth some attention.
A third option is to say that a superposition of states of consciousness is a
state that the subject is in, but it is not itself a total state of consciousness.
That is, when a subject is in a superposition of conscious states A and B, there
is no subjective experience of being in this superposition. There is something it
23Shimony (1963) reads London and Bauer (1939) as allowing superpositions of conscious-
ness and critiques the idea in part by arguing that phenomena such as blurred vision and
indecision do not really involve superpositions.
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is like to be in A, and something it is like to be in B, but nothing it is like to be
in A and B simultaneously. The subject has the experience of being in A and
the experience of being in B, without having any conjoint experience of being
in the superposition. This violates the Unity Thesis articulated by Bayne and
Chalmers (2003) holding that whenever a subject is in multiple conscious states,
they are also in a single conscious state that subsumes and unifies them. Some
theorists hold that the Unity Thesis is false, at least for split-brain patients and
other fragmented subjects: these subjects do not have a single determinate total
conscious state, but instead have multiple conscious states as fragments.24 It is
far from obvious what is really going on in these cases, and any analogy with
superposed states seems fairly distant. Still, these cases at least bring out that
the Unity Thesis and the corresponding assumption that every subject is in a
single determinate total state of consciousness is not non-negotiable.
A fourth option is to say that a superposition of total states of consciousness
is itself a total state of consciousness – albeit one quite unlike the ordinary
total states of consciousness that we are introspectively familiar with. On this
view, when a subject is in a superposition of conscious states A and B, there
is something it is like to be in this superposition. It presumably involves some
combination of the experience of being in A and the experience of being in
B, combined by some novel phenomenal mode of combination. This mode of
combination is not something we could introspect or report for the reasons
discussed above, so it would have to be something that we have no introspective
familiarity with. The phenomenological role of amplitudes is also not clear.
Perhaps amplitudes give the ordinary states of consciousness relative weights in
the combined states. As a result, it is far from clear what the phenomenology
of a superposed state would be like. Still, it is far from obvious that a mode of
combination like this is impossible.
We think that the fourth option is perhaps the most worthy of considera-
tion, followed by the third. On the fourth option, we can no longer say that
total states of consciousness correspond one-to-one with PCC eigenstates. In-
stead, ordinary non-superposed total states of consciousness will correspond to
PCC eigenstates, and superposed total states of consciousness will correspond
24On split-brain cases, see for example Nagel (1971) who argues for indeterminacy here.
Bayne and Chalmers (2003) argue that in these cases there is a single subject with a single
determinate state of consciousness, while Schechter (2017) argues that there are multiple
subjects each with a determinate state of consciousness.
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to superpositions of these eigenstates.
There is precedent to the thought that there are states of consciousness
that we cannot introspect or report. Theorists (e.g. Block) who believe in an
“overflow” of consciousness outside attention often postulate such aspects: if
introspecting and reporting a state always involve attending to it, unattended
states cannot be introspected or reported. One can perhaps make unnoticed
superpositions more palatable by noting that on a fast-collapse model they will
usually be small superpositions, involving very similar states of consciousness,
very low amplitudes, and/or very brief periods of time. As a result, the super-
positions may largely fall below the grain of our ordinary introspective access.
Still, the fact that our super-resistance model has to postulate superposed
states of consciousness is a significant cost of the view. Is it possible to develop
a super-resistance consciousness-collapse model that avoids superpositions of
consciousness while also avoiding the Zeno problem? Such a model would need
to give up on the tight connection between definite conscious states and PCC
eigenstates, in order that never-superposed conscious states do not lead to never-
superposed PCC states and so to the Zeno effect. At the same time, it would
need to retain enough of a connection between consciousness and physical states
that the definiteness of consciousness leads to collapse in its physical basis. It is
not easy to meet both demands at once. One path invokes a looser connection
between consciousness and PCC eigenstates, whereby superposed PCC states
can coexist with definite states of consciousness at least briefly. For example,
one might hold that superposed PCC states determine a definite state of con-
sciousness probabilistically according to the Born rule, and that this definite
state of consciousness leads to collapse onto a corresponding PCC state but
only after a time delay. Perhaps this view and others in the neighborhood are
at least worth developing.
In any case: in ordinary quantum mechanics, many theorists say that they
cannot really imagine what it is for a physical state to be in a superposition.
At the same time, they adopt the idea and run with it, and the idea seems to
be theoretically fruitful. Our suggestion is that we do something like this for
superpositions of states of consciousness, at least for now. We should simply
adopt the idea and see whether it is fruitful. If it is, we can later return to the
question of just what superposed states of consciousness involve.
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Objection 2: How do quantum effects make a difference to macro-
scopic brain processes?
Quantum theories of brain processes are sometimes criticized on the grounds
that it is hard to see how low-level quantum processes can affect high-level pro-
cessing in neurons. A more specific version of this objection is that on some
accounts (e.g. Hameroff and Penrose), quantum coherence at the neural level
is required for distinctively quantum effects in neural processing, but the high
temperatures in the brain are likely to lead to decoherence below the neural
level. These objections do not apply to our approach, which does not involve
any special effects of low-level quantum processes on neural processes and is en-
tirely consistent with decoherence at relatively low levels. In fact, in our central
illustrations, we have treated brain states as superpositions of numerous deco-
herent eigenstates, which themselves may involve relatively classical processing
in neurons. The only high-level quantum process that plays an essential role in
our framework is the collapse process, which selects one or more of these eigen-
states as outlined above. Our picture is consistent with further macroscopic
quantum effects, but they are not required.
Objection 3: What about macroscopic superpositions?
One might worry that on a consciousness-collapse view ordinary macroscopic
objects such as measurement devices will exist in states of superposition until
they are observed. Our view does not necessarily lead to this consequence. For
a start, if a correct theory of consciousness associates these devices with some
amount of consciousness (as may be the case for IIT), then the devices will
collapse wave functions much as humans do. Even if these devices are not con-
scious, it is likely that typical measuring devices will be entangled with humans
and other conscious systems, so that they will typically be in a collapsed state
too. Still, in special cases where such a device is entirely isolated from conscious
systems and records a quantum interaction, it will enter a macroscopic superpo-
sition. Of course we will never observe such a superposition, as our observation
will collapse the state of the system. But we might in principle get empirical ev-
idence of this superposition if we can eventually measure associated interference
effects. Perhaps the existence of macroscopic superpositions is counterintuitive,
but many cosmological theories already allow macroscopic objects to be in su-
perposition in the early universe where there are no observers. It is unclear why
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allowing this in the current universe is any worse.
Objection 4: What about the first appearance of consciousness in the
universe?
As we saw earlier, if consciousness is absolutely super-resistant, the quantum
Zeno effect entails that it can never emerge for the first time in the development
of the universe. On an approximate super-resistance model, there is less of a
problem. For eons, the universe can persist in a wholly unconscious superposed
state without any collapses. At some point, a physical correlate of consciousness
may emerge in some branch of the wave function, yielding a superposition of
consciousness and unconsciousness (or their physical correlates) with low am-
plitude for consciousness. With high probability the universe will collapse back
toward an unconscious state. As this happens repeatedly in many branches of
the wave function, there will eventually be a low probability collapse toward a
state of consciousness, and consciousness will be in a position to take hold.
10 Conclusion
The results of our analysis are mixed. We have developed a consciousness-
collapse model with a reasonably clear and precise dynamics. But it must be
admitted that the model we have developed is not as simple and powerful as
the original (simple if imprecise) measurement-collapse framework.
Our initial superselection collapse model was simple, but it leads to the
Zeno problem. Avoiding the Zeno problem has led to a number of complications.
First, we have had to countenance superpositions in states of consciousness, and
it is not at all clear that this is possible. Second, we have had to introduce Pearle-
style collapse dynamics along with parameters for the rate of collapse, and
these parameters have to be constrained carefully in order to yield empirically
acceptable results. We have also had to invoke a complex theory of consciousness
– though this is less of a cost, since a theory of consciousness is needed even in
the absence of the quantum measurement problem.
Is this consciousness-collapse model the best that we can do? We have
seen that to avoid countenancing superposed states of consciousness while also
avoiding the Zeno problem, a consciousness-collapse model will need to break
the strong link between definite states of consciousness and eigenstates of a
48
PCC observable. Perhaps there are alternative models on which the physical
correlates of consciousness involve a more complex wave-function property, or on
which consciousness can vary independently of any physical properties. There
also remain the possibility of variable-locus models, though these may also need
to break the strong link between consciousness and its physical correlates to
avoid the Zeno problem. In any case, models along these lines are certainly
worth exploring.
Overall: the model we have developed is perhaps not as simple or powerful
as some of the leading interpretations of quantum mechanics. If it is the best we
can do, then the upshot may be that consciousness-collapse models are subject
to principled limitations. Nevertheless, it at least serves as an existence proof
for a relatively precise consciousness-collapse model. The model is open to
empirical test, and it is not out of the question that a more powerful model
along these lines could be developed. In the meantime, the research program of
consciousness-collapse models deserves attention.
A Appendix: Calculating Q-shape for a dyad
system in IIT 3.0 and quantum IIT
In this appendix, we illustrate some mathematical details of standard IIT (IIT3.0)
and quantum IIT (QIIT), by showing how Φ and Q-shape are determined in
simple dyad systems with two elements. The IIT formalisms are complex, but
dyads avoid some complications. We will also define a distance measure between
Q-shapes which is important for the collapse dynamics.
We begin with IIT3.0.25 We assume a dyad system with two elements A and
B, each of which can be in one of two states: [1] or [0]. The composite system
AB can be in one of four possible states: [11], [00], [10], or [01]. The transition
rules are a simple swap: the state of A at one time is determined by copying
the state of B at the previous time and vice versa. We can stipulate that in
25Thanks to Nao Tsuchiya and Leo Barbosa. Our calculations follow the supporting in-
formation in Mayner et al. (2018) especially S1: Calculating Φ. See also Oizumi, Alban-
takis, and Tononi (2014) and Tononi et al. (2016). For the earlier, simpler IIT formalism
for calculating Φ(AB), see Tononi (2004, fig. 5), Tsuchiya (2017), and McQueen (2019a).
The reader can experiment with calculating Φ for various systems including the dyad AB
at http://integratedinformationtheory.org/calculate.html. Details of the underlying software
can be found in Mayner et al. (2018).
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the system under consideration, the current state of AB is [10]. The next state
is thereby determined to be [01]. Subsystems of AB are the nonempty sets of
elements of the system: {A}, {B}, and {A, B}, which we will abbreviate as A,
B, and AB when there is no chance of confusion. Mechanisms are subsystems
with nonzero weight.
The Q-shape of a system consists of a location L(m) for each mechanism
m in the system, weighted by the measure φ(m). L(m) is a point in a 2n+1-
dimensional space with two dimensions for each of the 2n possible states of the
system, where n is the number of elements. L(m) is determined by conjoining
two probability distributions over the states S of the system: pm(S) and p′m(S),
where the former is defined in terms of the effects of m and the latter is defined
in terms of the causes of m. Each distribution is associated with a φ value. The
weight φ(m) is the minimum of these two values. The Q-shape of AB lives in an
8-dimensional space, as AB has four possible states. As we will see, of the three
subsystems of AB, only A and B yield mechanisms with nonzero weight. Hence,
The Q-shape of AB consists in two weighted points located in an 8-dimensional
space.
IIT3.0 distinguishes two notions of integrated information: φ (small phi),
which applies to individual mechanisms, and Φ (big phi), which applies to the
total system. To know Φ(AB) we must first calculate AB’s Q-shape. To know
AB’s Q-shape we must first calculate φ for AB’s mechanisms. To begin with,
we illustrate how the probability distribution pm(S) and φ(m) are calculated
and then used to define Q-shape and Φ.
The distribution pm(S) is a distribution over future states S of the system,
reflecting their probability of occurrence given that the elements of m are fixed
to their current state (while any other elements are allowed to vary). For the
candidate mechanism AB, both elements will be fixed to their current value
[10]. pAB(S) is the probability that the following state will be S, given the
current state [10]. The following state is guaranteed to be [01], so pAB assigns
probability 1 to [01] and probability 0 to the other three states.
Recall that L(m) is determined by conjoining two probability distributions
over the states S of the system: pm(S) and p′m(S). If we consider just pm(S),
then the location L(AB) can be seen as a point in 4-dimensional space corre-
sponding to the distribution pAB(S). Let us say the four dimensions are ordered
as [00], [01], [10], [11]. Then L(AB)=[0,1,0,0], which assigns 1 to [01] and 0 to
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the other states. While pm(S) is a distribution over possible future states, p′m(S)
is a distribution over possible preceding states (i.e. the probabilities that the
preceding state was S, given the current state). For our system AB the two dis-
tributions are the same, so the 8-dimensional location will be a repeated version
of the 4-dimensional location: that is, L(AB)=[0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0].
For candidate mechanism A, pA(S) is the probability of the following state
being S given that element A is fixed to its current value [1], while the other
element B can vary with probability 0.5 for each value [0] or [1]. Under these
conditions, the following state may be either [01] or [11], and pA will assign
these two states probability 0.5 each. Likewise, pB will assign probability 0.5
each to states [00] and [01], the two states that can follow a state where B
is fixed to 0. As with AB, pm(S) = p′m(S) for A and for B. As a result,
L(A) = [0, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0.5] and L(B) = [0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0, 0].
The integrated information [small phi] φ(AB) is determined by considering
the difference between the probabilistic effects of the subsystem AB with the
effects of a partitioned subsystem A-B where we consider only the effects of A
and B taken separately on each other. We can define a probability distribution
pA−B as the tensor product of two distributions: a distribution pA|B over states
of A given that B is fixed to its current value 0 (so A=[1] has probability 1) and
a distribution pB|A over states of B given that A is fixed to its current value 1
(so B=[0] has probability 0). The product distribution pA−B assigns 1 to [10]
and 0 to every other state.
We can then define φ(AB) = EMD(pAB , pA−B). For two probability distri-
butions p1 and p2 over the same state-space, EMD(p1, p2) is the Earth mover’s
distance between p1 and p2. This can be defined as the minimal amount of work
required to turn p1 into p2 by moving the “Earth” of probability from some
points in the 2n-dimensional space to other points, where work is measured by
the amount of probability moved multiplied by the Hamming distance between
the points. In the case just described, pAB and pA−B are exactly the same
distribution, so the Earth mover’s distance between them is 0. So φ(AB) = 0.
The quantity φ(A) can be defined as a related Earth-mover’s distance over
states of B, comparing the distribution over those states with A fixed to its
current value of [1] (resulting in probability 1 to B=[0]) to a distribution that
ignores the value of A (resulting in probability 0.5 each to B=[0] or B=[1]). In
this case, φ(A) = 0.5. Likewise, φ(B) = 0.5.
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As a result, we can fully specify the Q-shape QAB of the system AB. It
consists of location L(AB) = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0] with associated weight φ(AB) =
0, location L(A) = [0, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0.5] with associated weight φ(A) = 0.5,
and location L(B) = [0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0, 0] with associated weight φ(B) =
0.5.
In the above calculations we took a shortcut that should now be made ex-
plicit. For each candidate mechanism, we chose to consider the probability
distribution assigned to the future (or past) states of a particular subsystem.
For candidate mechanism AB we chose subsystem AB. For candidate mecha-
nism A we chose subsystem B. And for B we chose A. These choices are not
arbitrary, but are the result of an optimization procedure. For each candidate
mechanism, we in fact consider all possible subsystems and choose the subsys-
tem that maximizes φ. For example, when considering candidate mechanism A,
it turns out that A has more integrated information about B than about AB.
After all, there are three possible ways of disconnecting A from AB: disconnect
A to A, A to B, A to AB. Nothing happens by disconnecting A to A (there
was no connection there to begin with!). But then that is the minimal informa-
tion partition, implying that A has zero φ about AB. On the other hand, there
is only one way to disconnect A from B, and that disconnection does make a
difference, giving nonzero φ. For details see Barbosa et al. (2021).
We can define the distance between two Q-shapes Q1 and Q2 (defined over
the same states S, with associated probability distributions pm,1 and pm,2 and
weights φ1(m) and φ2(m)) as an extended Earth mover’s distance EMD∗(Q1, Q2):
EMD∗(Q1, Q2) =∑
i




This distance is the minimal amount of work required to transform the φ1
distribution over mechanisms m into φ2 by repeatedly moving the “Earth” of φ
from one mechanism m1 in Q1 to another mechanism m2 in Q2. (A complication
is that in some cases (where Q1 has more total φ than Q2), we need to send the
excess to an unconstrained distribution puc associated with Q2.)
We can then define Φ(AB) as the minimal value of EMD*(QAB , QAB∗),
across all partitions AB∗ of AB. A partition of a system requires cutting one or
more causal connections between its units. For system AB, a partition cuts the
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connection from A to B or from B to A or both. In this case, either cut reduces
φ to zero for both mechanisms A and B, and their probability distributions are
flattened. The reason why cutting just one of these two connections destroys
both mechanisms is tied to the fact that φ(m) is defined as the minimum of two
φ values, the one that pertains to the future state and the one that pertains to
the past state. Each cut will send one of these φ values to zero.
Recall that QAB assigns φ(A) = φ(B) = 0.5, where these serve as weights for
L(A) = [0, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0.5] and L(B) = [0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0, 0]. QAB∗
instead assigns zero weights to both L(A∗) and L(B∗), where L(A∗) = L(B∗) =
[0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25]. We thus have: EMD∗(QAB , QAB∗) =
|φ(A)−φ(A∗)|×(EMD(pA, pA∗)+EMD(p′A, p′A∗))+|φ(B)−φ(B∗)|×(EMD(pB , pB∗)+
EMD(p′B , p′B∗)) = (0.5× (0.5 + 0.5)) + (0.5× (0.5 + 0.5)) = 1.
The crucial quantity Φmax(AB) is defined as Φ(AB) if AB is a maximum of
Φ, and 0 otherwise. Here AB is a maximum of Φ if Φ(AB) > Φ(S) for all systems
S such that S has elements in common with AB. In our case, we can stipulate
that AB is isolated from its environment so that no other system containing A
or B has higher Φ. In this case, AB is a maximum of Φ, so Φmax(AB) = 1.
According to IIT, Φmax is a measure of consciousness, so system AB has one
unit of consciousness.
In section 4 we noted that if AB is in a different state (either 01, 00, or 11),
than the calculation for Φ is the same, but the Q-shape is different. This can
now be seen by the fact that changing the initial state changes the locations
but not their weights. Thus, if the initial state is instead 00, then we still have
two mechanisms A and B, each with weight 0.5, but their locations become
L(A) = [0.5, 0.5, 0, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0, 0] and L(B) = [0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0]. This is
not enough to change Φ, but it is enough to change the Q-shape. We can thus
define Schroedinger’s dyad as AB in a superposition of 10 and 00. A collapse
model base only on Φ would fail to collapse this superposition, despite it being
a superposition of conscious states.
We now move to quantum IIT (QIIT).26 To simplify the calculations of the
dyad, it is easier to start A and B in the same initial state (|00〉 or |11〉) so that
they remain stationary. We add the further stipulation that A (B) maintains
its own state over time. We may now consider A and B to be AND gates that
26Thanks to Johannes Kleiner. Our calculations are intended to follow Zanardi, Tomka,
and Venuti (2018) and Kleiner and Tull (2020).
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State |00〉 has zero Φ and Q-shape, that is, Φ(|00〉) = Q(|00〉) = 0. For if we
partition the system by replacing one of the directed edges with random input,
the inputs are still only either 00 or 01, whereas the AND gates require an input
of 11 to change state. Partitioning does not make a difference.
Partitioning makes a difference if the system is instead in state |11〉: If any
of the edges are removed and replaced by random input, at least in half the
cases it will feed a 0 to its target, so that in light of the AND gate the state of
the target will change from 1 to 0. This implies that the system in that state
has non-zero Φ value, and its Q-shape isn’t null.
We can therefore introduce collapse operators for the Q-shapes of these two
states, and then use them to define a small consciousness superposition.
Our new dyad still has three subsystems (AB, A, and B). For each we con-
sider the integrated information φ of both future and past states. So for the
collapse operators Qkij , the k index runs from 1 to 6. Since the Hilbert space
of the system in this case is 4 dimensional, the indices i and j run from 1 to 4
each.
The ckij(ψ) in (2) are the coefficients of the operator ρ which is the kth
component of the Q-shape of ψ. Because Q(00) = 0, it follows that ckij(ψ0) =
0. Since |00〉 and |11〉 are wave functions with classical Q-shapes, they are




ϕk(ψ)ckij(ψ) |ψ〉 〈ψ| |00〉 = ϕk(00)ckij(00) |00〉 = 0 |00〉 (6)
We have assumed the wave functions with classical Q-shapes are orthogonal.





ϕk(ψ)ckij(ψ) |ψ〉 〈ψ| |11〉 = ϕk(11)ckij(11) |11〉 (7)
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so that |11〉 is an eigenvector of Qkij with eigenvalue ckij(|11〉).
Letting |11〉 be the alive (conscious) state and |00〉 be the dead (unconscious)
state, we can provide (in addition to the section 4 example) another example of
Schroedinger’s dyad:
|Ψ〉AB = α |00〉+ β |11〉 (8)
Our dynamics (in section 6) predicts that this state is not completely stable,
but continuously collapses towards one of the two Q-shape eigenstates, in accord
with the Born rule.
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